

Christian conservatism in global perspective:

US exceptionalism (again)?

Pippa Norris

Director, Democratic Governance
United Nations Development Programme
304, E 45th St, New York, NY 10017

JFK, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138
Pippa.norris@undp.org/Pippa_Norris@Harvard.edu
www.undp.org/governance/ www.pippanorris.com

Summary:

Since at least the mid-twentieth century, Protestants have been part of the bedrock Republican base. In the early-1990s the American party system experienced an important long-term realignment, however, where the religious population shifted towards the Republicans, while secularists moved towards the Democrats. Is this ‘religiosity gap’, which evidence from the NES suggests has persisted in subsequent United States elections, yet another example of ‘American exceptionalism’, reflecting particular characteristics of American society, politics and history?¹ Or does this phenomenon reflect broader developments with the heightened political salience of religion which is also evident in other societies? To examine these issues, this chapter analyzes the impact of religiosity on political ideology and voting behavior in cross-national perspective. Part I sets out Lipset and Rokkan’s classical theoretical framework for understanding processes of party-religious alignment. Part II considers cross-national survey evidence from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and the World Values Study. The analysis compares the strength of religious participation, religious values, and types of religious faith with left-right ideological orientations and voting support for religious parties. The results of the multivariate analysis suggest that two major findings. First, religious participation is consistently associated with more rightwing ideological orientations in many post-industrial and industrial societies, not just in the United States. At the same time, support for religious parties exemplified by the Christian Democrats has gradually eroded in many post-industrial societies, a pattern consistent with broader processes of secularization evident in these nations.² In this regard, the United States remains an outlier among affluent nations in the strength of religiosity and the powerful role it plays in shaping contemporary patterns of party politics and electoral behavior.

(*) It should be noted that the arguments and opinions expressed in this paper reflect the personal views of the author and do not represent the official policy or views of the United Nations or United Nations Development Programme.

Paper for the Sage Conference, New York 27-29th April 2007 and Chapter 3 for *Christian Conservatives and American Democracy* Edited by Steven Brint and Jean Reith Schroedel.

The emergence and persistence of the ‘religiosity gap’ in American voting behavior during the early-1990s is a well known phenomenon. According to the series of American National Election (NES) surveys, from 1952 to 2004 Protestants have been significantly more likely to identify with the Republican party, even after controlling for other structural factors such as age, education and gender. What changed in the early-1990s, however, is that the strength of religiosity (monitored by the self-reported frequency of attending church at least weekly) emerged as a significant predictor of party identification (see Tables 1 and 2). The Republicans have captured the support of the most religious sectors of American society, including half the population who report attending church once or twice a month or more regularly. By contrast secularists, who report attending church ‘never’ or just ‘a few times a year’, are in the Democratic camp. The religious gap has proved consistently significant for voting behavior in mid-term and presidential elections ever since. In the 2000 U.S. Presidential election, for example, the strength of religiosity was by far the strongest predictor of who voted for George W. Bush and Al Gore—dwarfing the explanatory power of social class, occupation, or region. Marked contrasts were evident between ‘traditionalists’: middle-aged married voters with children living in the rural South and Midwest who came from a religious background, supporting Bush, and the ‘modernists’ including single college-educated professionals living in urban cities on both coasts, who rarely attended church, and who voted for Gore.³ The religiosity gap was also evident in the 2004 contest, where many observer commonly noted sharp polarization between Democratic and Republicans over controversial ‘positional’ issues, exemplified by the legitimacy of gay marriage, stem cell research, the role of prayer in schools, sexual liberalization, the availability of divorce and abortion rights, and other ‘family’ values.

[Table 1 and 2 about here]

This phenomenon is all the more striking given the striking absence of similar patterns in at least some comparable post-industrial societies, such as marked contrasts evident between the role of religion in elections in United States and Britain. Patterns of Anglo-American party politics often display some similar cycles, such as the predominance of liberal-left politics during the early-1960s, and the Thatcher-Reagan market conservatism rolling back the role of the state during the 1980s. As leaders, both President George Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair express strong personal religious convictions. Nevertheless moral value issues did not feature in the 2005 British general election, where party support was predicted largely by attitudes towards valance issues. The ‘most important issue’ question suggested that during the campaign the public was concerned primarily about health care, taxes/services, education, crime, the economy, immigration, terrorism, Europe, and Iraq, in that order.⁴ Party competition in this contest revolved around government performance, such as on handling the economy and health care, which mattered most to the British electorate.⁵ The main role that religious identities played was a modest vote swing from Labour to the anti-war Liberal Democrats in seats with a high proportion of Muslim residents, probably as a reaction against Britain’s intervention in Iraq. At the turn of the 19th Century religion was one of the most fundamental cleavages in British party politics, dividing high church Tories from disestablishment Liberals, but outside of Northern Ireland, the long-term process of secularization has neutralized the importance of religious identities within the British electorate.

Therefore is the religiosity gap which has emerged in the United States since 1992 yet another example of ‘American exceptionalism’, reflecting particular characteristics of American society, politics and history, as suggested by Seymour Martin Lipset?⁶ Or does this reflect broader developments which are also evident in equally religious societies? To examine these issues, we need to analyze the impact of religiosity on voting behavior and ideological orientations in cross-national perspective. *Part I* sets out the classical theoretical framework established by Lipset and Rokkan. *Part II* considers evidence based on left-right orientations and voting support for religious parties. The conclusion suggests two main findings. First, *religious participation is strongly and significantly associated with rightwing orientations in many post-industrial and industrial societies*, in multivariate models with many prior controls. As in the US, more religious populations are generally more conservative in many developed nations. Nevertheless, *religious parties have gradually lost voting support in many post-industrial nations*, a pattern consistent with broader processes of secularization evident in these nations.⁷ The United States therefore remains an outlier among affluent nations in the strength of religiosity and the

powerful role it plays in shaping contemporary patterns of electoral behavior. Theories of existential security are suggested to help explain the former, while the emergence of stronger organizational links between the religious right and the Republican leadership can help explain patterns of party competition.

I: Structural theories of partisan alignment

The seminal cross-national studies of voting behavior during the 1960s by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan emphasized that social identities formed the basic building blocks of party support in Western Europe⁸. For Lipset and Rokkan, European nation-states were stamped by social divisions established decades earlier, including the regional cleavages of center vs. periphery, the class struggle between workers and owners, and the religious cleavages that split Christendom between Catholics and Protestants, and between practicing Christians and non-practicing individuals who were only nominally Christians. These traditional social identities were thought to be politically salient for several reasons. First, they reflected major ideological fissures in party politics. Divisions over social class mirrored the basic schism between the left, favoring a strong role for the state with redistributive welfare policies, and interventionist Keynesian economic management; and the right, advocating a more limited role for government and laissez-faire market economics. Moreover the religious division in party politics reflected heated moral debates concerning the role of women, marriage, and the family. Differences between core and periphery concerned how far governance in the nation-state should be centralized with parliaments in London, Madrid and Paris, or how far decision-making powers should be devolved to the regions and localities.

Lipset and Rokkan argued that organizational linkages gradually strengthened over the years, as the party systems that were in place in the 1920s gradually ‘froze’. Stable patterns of party competition continued to be based on the most salient primary cleavages and social cues dividing each society, such as the role of social class in Britain, religion in France, and language in Belgium⁹. The electoral systems used in Western Europe when the mass franchise was first expanded played a vital role in stabilizing party competition, reinforcing the legitimacy of those parties and social groups that had achieved parliamentary representation. Challenger parties, threatening to disturb the partisan status quo, faced formidable hurdles in the electoral thresholds needed to convert votes into seats and – an even more difficult hurdle—competing against the established party loyalties and party machines that had been built up by the existing major parties. Thus, patterned and predictable interactions in the competition for government became settled features of the electoral landscape throughout most established democracies. Lipset and Rokkan’s structural theory became the established orthodoxy for understanding voting behavior and party competition in Western Europe, and in other established democracies such as Australia and Canada. In the United States, Campbell et al’s *The American Voter* presented a social psychological model that gave central importance to the concept of partisan identification but which also emphasized that this orientation was deeply rooted in structural divisions within American society, above all those of socioeconomic status, race, religion, and region¹⁰.

Why did religious cleavages remain important in industrial societies? A large part of the explanation was the fact that the dominant Churches in Western Europe had succeeded in creating organizational networks, including strong links with Christian Democratic and other religious parties, just as trade unions had mobilized workers into supporting socialist, social democratic, and communist parties. The Church was linked with parties on the right that represented conservative economic policies and traditional moral values--initially concerning marriage and the family, and later including gender equality, sexual liberalization, and gay rights. In the United States, ‘born again’ fundamentalist Protestant churches became closely linked to the Republican Party, especially in the South. During the early 1980s, the Christian Right in America mobilized vigorously around conservative policies, such as the Right to Life movement advocating limiting or banning abortion, policies favoring the use of prayer in school, and later against legal recognition of homosexual marriage¹¹. The role of religion in party politics elsewhere has developed within varying contexts. In Ireland, Poland, and Italy, for example, the Catholic Church has taken conservative positions on issues such as divorce and reproductive rights, but in Poland the Church also became associated with nationalist opposition to the Soviet Union¹². In Latin American societies, the Church has often sided with liberal movements and actively defended human rights in opposition to repressive states and authoritarian regimes¹³.

The structural theory, however, needs to be qualified as many other factors also shape long-term patterns of party competition and electoral behavior. The mass basis of electoral politics and party competition can also be affected by such factors as the impact of the Second World War or the end of the Cold War; the influence of major electoral reforms on party fortunes; or significant expansions of the electorate¹⁴. Important shifts in the mass base of American parties, for example, were triggered by the diverse coalition assembled by FDR during the great depression, the post-war loss of 'yellow-dog' Democratic hegemony in the South, and the emergence of the modern gender gap in the early-1980s¹⁵. Nevertheless until at least the mid-1960s, party systems in many established democracies seemed to exhibit a rock-like stability, characterized by glacial evolution rather than radical discontinuities.

For most religious parties in Western Europe, the two decades after World War II were a period of unparalleled electoral success; in both Italy and West Germany, the Christian Democrats became the dominant parties during this era. Throughout Catholic Europe, including Belgium and Austria, Christian Democratic counterparts became the largest or next largest parties¹⁶. In post-war Britain, however, class was the dominant cleavage, reinforced by older religious divisions between high-Church Tories in England and low-Church Liberals in the periphery¹⁷. Cleavages between Protestant and Catholic communities deeply divided the electoral politics of Northern Ireland.¹⁸ In Latin America, Christian Democrat parties have played a major role. Religion has also been viewed as a fundamental political cleavage in party politics throughout the Middle East, South Asia and South East Asia, but until recently little cross-national survey data has been available to analyze systematic patterns of party competition and electoral support in these countries¹⁹.

Theories of partisan dealignment

From the mid-1970s onwards, a broad consensus developed in the literature on electoral behavior, suggesting that the traditional linkages between social groups and party support have weakened, although structural factors such as class, age, gender, and religion remain important predictors of voting choice, and there is little agreement among observers about the precise reasons for this phenomenon²⁰. Various observers have attributed trends in partisan dealignment in established democracies to a variety of complex developments in postindustrial societies, including: the process of secularization, which tended to erode religious identities; intergenerational value change, leading to the rise of new issues that cut across established party cleavages; the impact of social and geographic mobility weakening community social networks; the rise of television broadcasting replacing older channels of political communications through partisan newspapers, personal discussion and party campaign organizations; growing multiculturalism resulting from migration, which was generating cross-cutting social cleavages based on racial and ethnic identities; and the increased complexity of newer issues on the policy agenda, such as globalization, environmentalism, sexuality, and international terrorism, that do not comfortably fit into older patterns of party competition²¹. As a result of these processes, identities based on religious identities no longer seem as capable of generating unwavering and habitual party loyalties in many postindustrial societies as they were in the post-war era, opening the way for new types of parties challenging the status quo.

Electoral developments seemed to confirm these observations in many countries. New parties that were not based on the traditional social anchors of class and religion, started to gain electoral momentum and parliamentary representation. These new parties ranged from ethno-nationalist parties in Canada, Spain, and the United Kingdom, to Green parties in Germany, France, Sweden and elsewhere, to the anti-immigrant radical right such as the National Front in Britain and France, and a range of diverse 'protest' parties advocating cross-cutting moral and economic issues in Denmark, Italy, and the Netherlands.²² In recent years, the decline of the Christian Democratic parties and the center-right in Europe seems to have opened the way for electoral break-through by diverse new parties peddling a populist anti-immigrant, anti-multicultural campaign message. Recent examples include Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of the National Front, who was able to supplant the Socialist candidate as the second strongest vote-winner in France's 2002 Presidential elections; but other prominent successes won by such parties included the fact that Joerg Haider's far right Freedom Party won more than one quarter of the vote in the 1999 Austrian general election; the dramatic rise of the neo-populist Pim Fortuyn List in the May 2002 elections in the Netherlands (followed by the assassination of its leader); and a surge in support for Vlaams Blok, winning one fifth of the vote in Flanders in the May 2003

Belgian general election. The most successful radical right parties have been largely secular in orientation and appeal, focusing on economic populism and anti-immigrant rhetoric, seeking to tap into growing frustration with center-right parties rather than the sort of moral issues which have resonated for Christian conservatism in the United States.²³

If the rock-like ballast of traditional religious identities no longer ties voters to established parties, this is likely to have significant consequences by generating growing volatility in electoral behavior and in party competition; opening the door for more split-ticket voting across different electoral levels; facilitating the sudden rise of ‘protest’ politics; and creating more vote-switching within and across the left-right blocks of party families. Moreover this process should boost the political impact of short-term events during election campaigns, heightening the importance of short-term party strategies, the appeal of candidates and party leaders, and the impact of political communications, opinion polls, and the news media²⁴.

II: Evidence of partisan dealignment

But has secularization actually eroded support for religious parties throughout post-industrial societies as a whole? Some light can be thrown on these questions from the analysis of data drawn from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), developed in detail elsewhere.²⁵ Parties were classified on a 10-point left-right scale, where votes for each party family were recoded using a 10-point scale ranging from left (low) to right (high) as follows: (1) Communist, (2) Ecology, (3) Socialist, (4) Social Democrat, (5) Left liberal, (6) Liberal, (7) Christian Democrat, (8) Right liberal, (9) Conservative, and (10) 'Nationalist/Religious'. For the descriptive statistics, the scale was then dichotomized into rightwing and leftwing blocks. The social characteristics of voters supporting right-wing parties were then analyzed. Two major findings are evident. First, as shown in Figure 1, the results demonstrate that among different structural identities, religiosity remains more strongly and more consistently related to voting choice today than any of the various indicators of socioeconomic status. In the pooled model used in the CSES study, comparing thirty-seven presidential and parliamentary elections from the mid-to-late 1990s in 32 nations, almost three-quarters (70%) of the most religious (defined as those who reported attending religious services at least once per week) voted for parties of the right. By contrast, among the most secular, defined as those who never attended religious services, less than half (45%) voted for the right.

[Figure 1 and Table 3 about here]

The substantial 25-point mean religiosity gap proved far stronger than that produced by any of the alternative indicators of socioeconomic status, such as education, social class or income. The results continued to prove significant in multivariate models using the pooled CSES sample in 28 nations, where again religiosity is a better predictor of rightwing voting than any of the other social variables (Table 3). Across all elections in the CSES, in these countries Catholic voters were significantly more likely to vote for parties of the right than were Protestants; and atheists were more likely to vote for the parties of the Left than were any other of the social groups examined. Religiosity was particularly strongly related to voting choice in Israel, the Netherlands and Belgium-- all countries where religious divisions have long been regarded as some of the most critical components of cleavage politics; but this was also true in such ex-communist countries as Hungary and the Czech Republic.

Left-Right Orientations and Religion

The CSES provides evidence from 32 nations, including established and newer democracies, and both industrial and post-industrial societies. The WVS covers a considerably wider range of nations, covering low-income societies, non-industrial societies, Muslim and other cultural regions, as well as industrial and post-industrial societies. Does the evidence from this broader range of variation show similar patterns? In particular, does it confirm the finding that the relative influence of religious participation, values and identities is greater than that of social class? And what is the linkage between religiosity and voter choice in relatively traditional agrarian societies?

Classifying parties as belonging to the ‘Left’ or the ‘Right’ party is relatively straightforward among established democracies, but it becomes much more difficult when we undertake to compare the many parties

in newer transitional and consolidating democracies, especially those based on personalized politics that lack a clear ideological or programmatic identity. We can, however, compare ideological orientations rather than voting intention, based on where respondents place themselves on a left-right ideological scale. Respondents were asked the following question: “*In political matters, people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right’. How would you place your views on this scale generally speaking?*” The scale proved to be well balanced with minimal skew, and showed a normal distribution in all three types of society. We also found low non-response rates in most societies; even less educated respondents in poorer societies could place themselves on this scale. For descriptive comparisons the 10-point ideological orientation scale was dichotomized into ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ categories for ease of presentation. This 10-point ideological scale consistently proved to be a strong predictor of voting choice in those countries where the political parties could be unambiguously classified and placed on a right-left scale. Table 4 presents the proportion placing themselves on the Right half of the scale (those placing themselves at points 6 through ten), analyzed by type of society and by individual religious faith.

[Table 4 about here]

The descriptive results, without applying any social controls, indicate that religious participation was associated with Right ideological self-placement: across all nations 53% of among those who attended services of worship at least weekly, placed themselves on the Right; only 41% of those who did *not* attend this frequently, placed themselves on the Right, generating a 12-point religious gap. This difference was relatively strong in postindustrial and industrial societies, but relatively weak in agrarian societies. The individual’s self-described level of religiosity shows a similar pattern (not surprisingly, given the strong link that we have found between religious values and participation): 50% of those who believed that religion was ‘very important’ placed themselves on the Right, compared with 40% of those who viewed religion as less important. This religious gap was again in a consistent direction across all types of societies, although again, it was largest in post-industrial societies. Figure 2 confirms that the relationship between religious values (measured by the 10-point ‘importance of God scale’) and left-right self-placement was also shows a similar relationship. In all three types of societies, rising levels of religiosity go with rising levels of political support for the right (with minor fluctuations in the trend line).

[Figure 2 about here]

The contrasts by type of individual religious faith were also striking: only one third of those who said they did not belong to any faith, placed themselves on the Right half of the ideological spectrum, with fully two-thirds placing themselves on the left. This pattern was clearest in postindustrial societies, and was not evident in agrarian states. Those of the Jewish faith were also more likely to place themselves on the Left than average, while Protestants, Hindus and Buddhists were relatively likely to place themselves on the Right. People of the Orthodox faith tended to place themselves on the Left, but this is linked with the fact that the Orthodox tend to be concentrated in ex-communist societies, where Left ideological affiliations are relatively widespread.

[Table 5 about here]

It seems likely that certain social characteristics that help to predict religiosity, such as age, could also be associated with more Right orientations. Multivariate analysis can help us sort out the impact of such variables. Table 5 presents a model with the full battery of developmental and social controls. In industrial and post-industrial societies the results show that religious participation remains a significant positive predictor of Right orientations, even after entering controls for levels of human and democratic development, and the traditional social factors associated with ideological orientations including gender, age, education, income and social class. Indeed in these societies, religious participation emerges as the single strongest predictor of Right ideology in the model, showing far more impact than any of the indicators of social class. Among the different types of faith, there is a mixed pattern, suggesting that this could relate to the political role of the church, temple or mosque, but Protestants consistently emerge as more likely to place themselves on the Right than the average respondent in all societies. In agrarian societies, by contrast, religious participation is *negatively* associated with Right self-placement: the pattern that has been found consistently in industrial and post-industrial societies, does *not* apply to agrarian societies.

[Table 6 about here]

To examine this pattern further we need to examine the results within each nation, and also within each wave of the survey, to see whether secularization has generated religious dealignment and a weakening of the religious-ideological relationship during the last twenty years. Table 6 displays the simple correlations, without any controls, between religious values and Right orientations in each country and period. The results show two main patterns. First, the significance of the correlations demonstrate the consistency of the underlying relationships: those who regard religion as important to their lives are more Right in orientation in almost all nations, and at different time periods. The only exception is Nigeria, where the impact of religious values consistently proves to be insignificant. In large part, this reflects a lack of variation in religious values: almost all Nigerians consider religion to be very important.

Religion continues to be a relatively strong predictor of an individual's ideological positions. But we find indications that this relationship has weakened over time, as dealignment theory suggests. The summary 'change' symbol in the right-hand column represents the shift in the correlation coefficient across each available wave of the survey: a negative polarity (-) indicates that the strength of the relationship between religious values and Right ideological self-placement has weakened over time, from the first to the last available observation. Table 6 shows that among the twenty post-industrial societies, this relationship has *weakened* in fifteen nations, and grown stronger in only five (but these five include the United States). In industrial societies, we find a broadly similar pattern in which the correlations have weakened in eleven nations and grown stronger in only six. Lastly in the few agrarian societies where comparison is possible over time, South Africa shows a complicated picture, in large part because of the ceiling effect already noted for Nigeria (almost everyone is religious); while India and Bangladesh both show increasingly strong links between religious values and Right orientations over time.

The results suggest that religion has by no means disappeared as one of the factors predicting ideological positions. This is especially true in such countries as in countries such as Spain, Ireland, Italy, France and Belgium, as well as in Slovenia, Turkey, and Croatia, where the correlations between religion and ideological self-placement are still moderately strong in the latest wave. But less there are indicators that *during the last twenty years, this relationship has been gradual weakening as an ideological cue in most industrial and postindustrial countries*, as predicted by secularization theory. This does *not* seem to be happening in the few agrarian societies for which we have time series data.

Voting support for religious parties

This chapter has examined the relation ship between religion and ideological placement on the left-right scale, but what about absolute level of support for religious parties? Let us compare the electoral strength of religious parties during the postwar era, as measured by their share of the vote cast in national elections in sixteen post-industrial societies from 1945-1994. Lane, McKay and Newton classified parties as 'religious', and monitored their share of the vote, in the second edition of the *Political Data Handbook OECD Countries*.

[Figure 2 and Table 6 about here]

The results in Table 7 and Figure 3 illustrate the trends, showing that a decline in support for religious parties has occurred during the last half century, especially in Catholic Europe. The decline of voting support for religious parties is sharpest in Belgium, France and Italy (as well as a shorter-term trend in Portugal), with more modest erosion occurring in Luxembourg and Austria. By contrast, Ireland shows a slight strengthening of this relationship. Most countries in Protestant Europe, as well as in Shinto Japan and Orthodox Greece, show a pattern of weak but stable support for religious parties. The only traditionally Protestant country showing a sharp decline in support for religious parties is the Netherlands.

Conclusions

In earlier stages of history, religious identities provided a cue that oriented electors towards political parties, as well as towards their ideological positions on the political spectrum. In this regard, differences between Protestants and Catholics in Western Europe functioned as a cognitive shortcut, like the role of

social class, which linked voters to parties; these linkages often persisted throughout an individual's lifetime. In recent decades, however, as secularization has progressively weakened religious identities in advanced industrial societies, the political impact of denominational differences can be expected to prove less important in party and electoral politics. As a result, parties that once had strong organizational links to the Catholic Church, notably the Christian Democrats in West Germany, Italy, and Austria, have become more secular in their electoral appeals, moving towards 'bridging strategies' that enable them to win electoral support from many diverse social groups.

The pattern documented in this chapter at both individual and at macro-level is broadly consistent with these expectations. Two findings are evident. First, in postindustrial nations, religious participation and religious values continue to predict ideological orientations and voting support for rightwing parties. For example, there was a 15% gap among those who place themselves ideologically on the right among those who do and do not attend church regularly. This religious gap remains significant even after employing the standard battery of societal and individual controls. This gap is also consistently found in many diverse post-industrial societies, suggesting that there is a fairly universal pattern at work in people's ideological orientations.

Nevertheless, at the same time, the relationship between religiosity and Right political orientations appears to have weakened during the last twenty years in most industrial and postindustrial societies, with some exceptions such as the United States and Austria. In an important sense, the bottom-line test lies in the votes actually cast in national elections—and we find that during the past fifty years, support for religious parties has fallen in most postindustrial nations, especially in Catholic Europe. This trend almost perfectly reflects patterns of regular churchgoing in Europe: in both cases, religion starts from a far higher base, and then falls more sharply, in Catholic than in Protestant European countries. Secularization appears to be a process that started in Protestant Europe well before survey evidence began to become available, so that at the start of the postwar era, these countries already had lower levels of religious behavior and support for religious parties than those existing in Catholic countries. Consequently, during the past half-century the process of secularization has affected Catholic Europe most strongly, so that these countries are now approaching, but not yet attaining, the low levels of religiosity found in Northern Europe. Unlike the advanced industrial societies of Europe and North America, a substantial body of time-series data is unavailable to analyze trends in developing countries—but the limited evidence that is available indicates that these trends have not been occurring there: there is no evidence of a worldwide decline of religiosity, or of the role of religion in politics: secularization is a phenomenon characteristic of industrial and postindustrial society.

As a result of these developments, the United States does remain an outlier among comparable postindustrial societies, notably the emergence of the religious cleavages in electoral politics which has been evident over successive contests since the early-1990s. What explains this anomaly? Evidence presented elsewhere suggests that secularization has generally been sweeping through most affluent nations, in politics as well as in society, although the pace of change and its effects differ from one place to another.²⁶ Many reasons can be advanced to account for why America trends may differ. In the Fundamentalism Project, Gabriel Almond and his co-authors sought to explain the contemporary strength of religiosity in the United States by particular distinctive characteristics commonly observed in America when compared with many other postindustrial societies, such as relatively high levels of social and geographic mobility, historical patterns of large-scale migration, economic insecurity, and other factors.²⁷ Other possible explanations which have been suggested lie in the role of status politics, "lifestyle politics," demographic shifts among Christian whites toward more homogeneous exurban communities, and the organizational links between certain wings found within the Republican party and the leadership of the Christian conservative movement. The full reasons for this phenomenon lie beyond this brief chapter but, based on evidence and a theoretical framework developed in detail elsewhere, the most plausible explanation for the strength of religiosity in the America lies in patterns of existential insecurity, which generate the demand for religion widely observed in the United States.²⁸ Evidence suggests that due to rising levels of human security, the publics of virtually all advanced industrial societies have been moving toward more secular orientations. Elsewhere it has been

demonstrated that "modernization" (the process of industrialization, urbanization, and rising levels of education and wealth) greatly weakens the influence of religious institutions in affluent societies, bringing lower rates of attendance at religious services, and making religion subjectively less important in people's lives. The overall trend is clear: within most advanced industrial societies, church attendance has fallen, not risen, over the past several decades; moreover, the clergy have largely lost their authority over the public and are no longer able to dictate to them on such matters as birth control, divorce, abortion, sexual orientation and the necessity of marriage before childbirth. Secularization is not taking place only in Western Europe, as some critics have claimed (though it was first observed there). It is occurring in most advanced industrial societies including Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Canada.

The United States remains an outlier among postindustrial societies, having a public that holds much more traditional worldviews than that of any other rich country except Ireland. But even in America, there has been a lesser but perceptible trend toward secularization; the trend has been partly masked by massive immigration of people with relatively traditional worldviews (and high fertility rates) from Hispanic countries as well as by relatively high levels of economic inequality; but when one controls for these factors, even within the U.S. there has been a significant movement toward secularization. The emergence of the religious cleavages in electoral politics in America, which has been evident over successive contests since the early-1990s, is therefore best interpreted as a product of organizational linkages which developed a decade earlier between the leaders of the Christian conservative movement and the Republican party. This new alignment built upon historic links, where Protestants have been the bedrock foundation of the Republican base since at least the mid-twentieth century. The contemporary salience of religiosity in American society, despite some degree of secularization, coupled with the emergence of stronger organizational links between the religious right and the Republican leadership, can help explain patterns of contemporary party competition and the emergence and persistence of the 'religious gap' in the American electorate.

Table 1: Religiosity and partisan identification, US elections in 1972, 1992, 2000

1972: George McGovern v Richard Nixon	B	Std Error	Beta	Sig
Protestant	.675	.175	.149	***
Catholic	-.010	.205	-.002	N/s
Church attendance (weekly)	.051	.111	.012	N/s
Age (years)	.005	.003	.038	N/s
Education	.198	.032	.167	***
Gender (male)	-.001	.105	-.003	N/s
Race (white)	1.318	.169	.198	***
Constant	1.02			
Adjusted R2	.086			

1992: Bill Clinton v. George Bush	B	Std Error	Beta	Sig
Protestant	.533	.116	.125	***
Catholic	.038	.133	.008	N/s
Church attendance (weekly)	.304	.097	.064	***
Age (years)	-.011	.002	-.091	***
Education	.079	.024	.066	***
Gender (male)	.335	.083	.080	***
Race (white)	1.02	.097	.210	***
Constant	2.58			
Adjusted R2	.081			

2000: Al Gore v. George W. Bush	B	Std Error	Beta	Sig
Protestant	.406	.133	.095	***
Catholic	.213	.149	.044	N/s
Church attendance (weekly)	.442	.116	.093	***
Age (years)	-.013	.003	-.101	***
Education	.078	.031	.060	**
Gender (male)	.366	.098	.086	***
Race (white)	1.059	.114	.219	***
Constant				
Adjusted R2	.077			

Note: The OLS regression models monitored religious identities, church attendance, age, education, gender and race. Partisan identification is the dependent variable, measured on a 7-pt scale. "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?" (IF REPUBLICAN OR DEMOCRAT) "Would you call yourself a strong (REPUBLICAN/DEMOCRAT) or a not very strong (REPUBLICAN/ DEMOCRAT)?" (IF INDEPENDENT, OTHER [1966 and later: OR NO PREFERENCE]); "Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party?" Coded from 1 (Strong Democrat) to 7 (strong Republican).

Source: American National Election Study 1970-2004

Table 2: US Church attendance 1970-2004

	'70	'72	'74	'76	'78	'80	'82	'84	'86	'88	'90	'92	'94	'96	'98	'00	'02	'04
Every Week	38	26	25	25	25	25	28	24	27	25	27	27	28	25	24	25	25	23
Almost Every Week	-	11	12	12	11	12	12	11	11	11	11	11	11	12	13	11	12	12
Once or Twice a Month	16	12	12	14	12	11	13	14	13	14	14	14	13	16	14	16	18	15
A Few Times a Year	30	32	31	29	30	29	27	29	28	28	16	15	16	18	15	16	13	15
Never	12	14	13	13	14	14	11	14	12	12	33	34	33	30	33	33	32	35
No relig. preference	5	4	7	6	9	9	9	8	8	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
N	1475	2677	2480	2827	2271	1589	1397	2225	2144	2024	1963	2475	1769	1703	1271	1789	1498	1204

Note: 1970-1988: (IF ANY RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE) "Would you say you/do you go to (church/synagogue) every week, almost every week, once or twice a month, a few times a year, or never?"
 1990 and later: "Lots of things come up that keep people from attending religious services even if they want to. Thinking about your life these days, do you ever attend religious services, apart from occasional weddings, baptisms or funerals?" (IF YES:) "Do you go to religious services every week, almost every week, once or twice a month, a few times a year, or never?"

Source: American National Election Study 1970-2004

Table 3: Baseline models predicting rightwing voting support, pooled legislative elections

	Model A				Model B				Coding
	B	S.E.	Beta	Sig.	B	S.E.	Beta	Sig.	
SOCIAL STRUCTURE									
Age	-.008	.001	-.05	***	-.006	.001	-.04	***	A2001 Years old
Sex (Male)	.226	.035	.05	***	.112	.032	.02	***	A2002 Male=1/Female=0
Education	.040	.018	.02	*	.047	.017	.02	**	A2003 Highest level of education of respondent. Primary 1, secondary 2, post-secondary technical 3, university 4.
Income	.113	.014	.06	***	.081	.012	.05	***	A2012 5-point scale of household income from lowest to highest quintile.
Union member	-.609	.040	-.11	***	-.374	.036	-.07	***	A2005 Respondent is union member 1, else 0
Linguistic majority	.362	.036	.08	***	.224	.033	.05	***	A2018 Language usually spoken at home. Linguistic majority 1, else 0
Religiosity	.311	.010	.24	***	.189	.009	.15	***	A2015 6-point strength of religiosity scale from never attend religious service (1) to attend at least weekly (6).
IDEOLOGY									
Left-right ideology					.409	.006	.43	***	A3031 Position respondents placed themselves on the 10-point scale from left (0) to right (10).
Constant	4.6								
Adjusted R ²	.074				.248				

Notes: The figures represent the results of OLS multiple regression analysis models including unstandardized beta coefficients (B), standardized error (S.E.), standardized beta coefficients (Beta) and their significance (P). *** p.001 ** p.01 * p.05.

Voting Choice: For the dependent measure, votes for each party family are recoded using a 10-point scale ranging from left (low) to right (high) as follows: (1) Communist, (2) Ecology, (3) Socialist, (4) Social Democrat, (5) Left liberal, (6) Liberal, (7) Christian Democrat, (8) Right liberal, (9) Conservative, and (10) 'Nationalist/ Religious'. A positive coefficient indicates support for parties on the right. The pooled sample of legislative elections includes 28 nations and 17,794 respondents. Data was weighted by A104_1 to ensure that the size of the sample is equal per nation.

Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, Module 1 1996-2002.

Table 4: % Support for the Right by society and religiosity

	Agrarian	Industrial	Post-industrial	All	Coef.	Sig.
Religious participation						
Attend church at least weekly	48	54	55	53		
Do not attend weekly	46	40	40	41	.112	***
Religious values						
Religion ‘very important’	48	51	52	50		
Religion not ‘very important’	45	40	40	40	.115	***
Religious faith						
None	52	37	32	36	.094	***
Catholic	46	49	45	47	.047	***
Protestant	47	50	48	48	.028	***
Orthodox	35	39	39	38	.033	***
Jewish	42	43	39	41	.007	**
Muslim	48	42	38	46	.033	***
Hindu	48	50	45	48	.015	***
Buddhist	76	63	63	64	.043	***
ALL	47	44	44	45	.049	***

Notes: Left-right self-placement: *Q*: “In political matters, people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right’. How would you place your views on this scale generally speaking?” Left (1) Right (10). The scale is dichotomized for this table into Left (1-5) and Right (6-10). The figures represent the proportion that is Right in each category, with the remainder categorized as Left.

Religious participation: “Do you attend religious services several times a week, once a week, a few times during the year, once a year or less, or never?” The percentage that reported attending religious services ‘several times a week’ or ‘once a week’.

Religious values: Q10 “How important is religion in your life? Very important, rather important, not very important, not at all important?”

The significance of the mean difference on the left-right scale is measured by the Eta coefficient using ANOVA. Significance ***=.001 **=.01 *=.05 **Source:** World Values Survey pooled, 1981-2001.

Table 5: Explaining Right orientations, pooled model all nations

	Agrarian				Industrial				Postindustrial			
	B	St. Err.	Beta	Sig	B	St. Err.	Beta	Sig	B	St. Err.	Beta	Sig
Developmental controls												
Level of human development (100-point scale)	-1.08	.235	-.05	***	-2.45	.548	-.04	***	2.43	1.74	.01	N/s
Level of political development	-.074	.021	-.04	***	.025	.014	.01	N/s	.977	.091	.10	***
Social controls												
Gender (Male=1)	.179	.051	.03	***	.120	.029	.03	***	.199	.028	.05	***
Age (years)	.003	.002	.01	N/s	-.003	.001	-.02	***	.006	.001	.05	***
Education (3 categories low to hi)	-.103	.040	-.03	**	-.212	.022	-.07	***	-.085	.022	-.07	***
Income (10 categories low to hi)	.007	.010	.01	N/s	.005	.006	.01	N/s	.055	.006	.08	***
Class (4-point scale)	-.053	.023	-.02	*	-.098	.014	-.05	***	-.147	.015	-.08	***
Religious participation and type of faith												
Religious participation	-.051	.015	-.04	***	.171	.008	.15	***	.151	.008	.15	***
Protestant	.476	.098	.08	***	.393	.075	.04	***	.281	.077	.07	***
Catholic	.537	.107	.06	***	.321	.057	.07	***	.120	.081	.03	N/s
Orthodox	-.531	.172	-.03	***	.302	.081	.03	***	-3.71	.891	-.03	***
Muslim	.697	.096	.12	N/s	.035	.075	.01	N/s	-.242	.258	-.01	N/s
Jewish	.295	.285	.01	***	-.202	.332	-.01	N/s	-.670	.199	-.03	***
Hindu	.513	.114	.06	***	.331	.926	.01	N/s	.528	.464	.01	N/s
Buddhist	2.46	.302	.08	***	.631	.127	.03	***	.731	.133	.05	***
None/Atheist	1.04	.122	.09	***	.196	.052	.04	***	-.089	.082	-.02	N/s
(Constant)	6.54				7.23				-4.06			
Adjusted R²	.025				.034				.067			

Note: The table presents the results of an ordinary least squares regression model where ideological orientation on the 10-point left-right scale is the dependent variable, with left=1, and right=10. The figures represent the unstandardized beta (B), the standard error (s.e.), the standardized Beta, and the significance of the coefficient (Sig). ***P.001 ** .01 * .05 N/s Not significant.

Religious participation: Q185 *“Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days? More than once a week, once a week, once a month, only on special bold days, once a year, less often, never or practically never.”*

Religious faith: *‘Do you belong to a religious denomination? If yes, ‘Which one?’* If ‘No’ coded None/atheist (0). Measured at individual level.

Source: World Values Survey pooled, 1981-2001.

Table 6: Correlations between religious values and Right orientations

	Early 1980s		Early 1990s		Mid- 1990s		2000		Chg
Postindustrial									
Australia	.179	***			.113	***			-
Austria			.098	***			.163	***	+
Belgium	.391	***	.266	***			.173	**	-
Britain	.205	***	.111	***			.152	***	-
Canada	.148	***	.102	***			.065	**	-
Denmark	.263	***	.154	***			.095	**	-
Finland	.203	***	.139	***	.149	***	.208	***	+
France	.322	***	.281	***			.200	***	-
Germany, East			.306	***	.187	***	.219	***	-
Germany, West	.267	***	.224	***	.185	***	.220	***	-
Iceland	.137	***	.091	***			.087	**	-
Ireland	.244	***	.298	***			.267	***	+
Italy	.325	***	.288	***			.227	***	-
Japan	.097	***	.111	***	.136	***	.128	***	+
Netherlands	.346	***	.384	***			.164	***	-
Norway	.158	***	.126	***	.064	*			-
Spain	.434	***	.342	***			.360	***	-
Sweden	.151	***	.112	***	.048	N/s	.034	N/s	-
Switzerland			.188	***	.132	**			-
United States	.157	***	.220	***	.176	***	.172	***	+
Industrial									
Argentina	.270	***	.221	***	.233	***	.165	**	-
Brazil			.094	***	.081	**			-
Bulgaria			.258	***	.154	***	.154	***	-
Chile			.182	***	.077	*	.065	*	-
Croatia					.277	***	.194	***	-
Czech Rep					.188	***	.144	***	-
Hungary			.204	***	.158	***	.167	***	-
Latvia					.096	**	.129	***	+
Mexico	.160	***	.245	***	.090	***	.068	*	-
Poland			.140	**		***	.221	***	+
Portugal			.210	***			.136	***	-
Russia			.068	*	.065	*	.036	N/s	-
Serbia					.082	**	.066	N/s	-
Slovakia					.162	***	.221	***	+
Slovenia			.178	***	.252	***	.313	***	+
Turkey			.313	***			.314	***	+
Ukraine					.132	***	.192	***	+
Agrarian									
South Africa	.234	***	.109	***	.013	N/s	.003	N/s	-
Nigeria			.032	N/s	.014	N/s	-.013	N/s	
India			.157	***	.368	***			+
Bangladesh					.062	*	.183	***	+

Note: The coefficients represent simple correlations between *religious values* (measured by the 10-point 'importance of God' scale) and *Right orientations* (measured by the 10-point left-right ideology scale when 1=left and 10= right), without any prior controls.

Chg represents change in the strength of the correlation coefficient from the earliest data point to the latest data point, where - = weaker +=stronger. **Source:** World Values Survey, 1981-2001.

Table 7: The electoral strength of religious parties in national elections in post-industrial societies, 1945-1994


Nation	1945-49	1950-54	1955-59	1960-64	1965-69	1970-74	1975-79	1980-84	1985-89	1990-94
Catholic cultures										
Austria	46.9	41.3	45.1	45.4	48.3	43.9	42.4	43.0	41.3	29.9
Belgium	44.2	44.9	46.5	44.4	33.3	31.3	36.1	26.4	28.4	24.5
France	26.4	12.5	11.2	8.9	11.5	16.2	5.3	5.2		
Ireland	19.8	28.9	26.6	32.0	34.1	35.1	30.5	37.7	28.2	24.5
Italy	41.9	40.1	42.4	38.2	39.0	38.7	38.5	32.9	34.3	22.7
Luxembourg	39.2	42.4	36.9	33.3	35.3	27.9	34.5	34.9	32.4	30.3
Portugal							14.3	22.3	8.0	4.4
Protestant cultures										
Finland			0.2	0.8	0.4	1.8	4.1	3.0	2.6	3.0
Norway	8.2	10.5	10.2	9.6	8.8	12.3	12.4	9.4	8.4	7.9
Germany, West	34.1	46.0	50.2	45.3	46.9	44.9	48.6	46.7	44.3	42.7
Netherlands	55.4	54.7	52.5	52.2	47.4	41.9	37.8	36.7	40.5	27.0
Switzerland	22.1	23.5	24.5	25.0	23.7	22.8	23.4	22.5	20.0	20.5
Sweden				0.9	1.5	1.8	1.4	1.9	2.7	5.6
Denmark						3.0	3.8	2.5	2.2	2.1
Other religious cultures										
Japan					8.2	8.5	10.4	9.6	9.4	8.1
Turkey						11.9	8.6		7.2	16.9
Mean	32.4	33.7	30.1	26.4	24.2	21.3	19.4	20.8	18.0	15.1

Notes:

Religious parties: For the classification of parties in each country, see Table 7.3 in the source handbook. No religious parties with more than 1% of the vote were identified in Spain, Greece, Iceland, UK, Canada, New Zealand, the United States, or Australia. The table lists the percentage share of valid votes cast for religious parties in national elections. The percentage includes the CDU/CSU, ÖVP and DC.


Source: Data 1945-1994: Jan-Erik Lane, David McKay and Kenneth Newton. 1997. *Political Data Handbook OECD Countries. 2nd edition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Table 7.5a. Data for 1995-2000 *Elections around the world*. <http://www.electionworld.org/election/>

Figure 1: The social characteristics of right-wing voters, CSES




Notes: *Left-Right Vote:* Party vote in legislative elections for the lower house classified on a 10-point scale ranging from communist (1) to Nationalist (10) dichotomized into rightwing and leftwing blocks. **Source:** Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, Module 1 1996-2002. Pooled sample.

Figure 2: Religious values and left-right self-placement



Note:

Figure 3: The electoral strength of religious parties in national elections in post-industrial societies, 1945-1994



Source: Jan-Erik Lane, David McKay and Kenneth Newton. 1997. *Political Data Handbook OECD Countries. 2nd edition.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. Table 7.5a.

-
- ¹ Seymour Martin Lipset. 1997. *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company
- ² David Broughton and Hans-Martien ten Napel. Eds. 2000. *Religion and Mass Electoral Behavior in Europe*. London: Routledge.
- ³ Pippa Norris. 2000. 'US Campaign 2000: Of Pregnant Chads, Butterfly Ballots and Partisan Vitriol.' *Government and Opposition*; VNS Exit Polls in 'Who Voted?' *New York Times* November 12 2000; Andrew Kohut, John C. Green, Scott Keeter and Robert C. Toth. 2000. *The Diminishing Divide: Religion's Changing Role in American Politics*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- ⁴ Pippa Norris and Christopher Wlezien. 'Introduction' and 'Conclusion'. In Pippa Norris and Christopher Wlezien. Ed. *Britain Votes 2005*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- ⁵ Paul Whiteley, Marianne C. Stewart, David Sanders, and Harold D. Clarke. 2005. 'The Issue Agenda and Voting in 2005.' In Pippa Norris. Ed. *Britain Votes 2005*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- ⁶ Seymour Martin Lipset. 1997. *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company
- ⁷ David Broughton and Hans-Martien ten Napel. Eds. 2000. *Religion and Mass Electoral Behavior in Europe*. London: Routledge.
- ⁸ Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan. 1967. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*. New York: Free Press. See also Robert R. Alford, 1967. 'Class Voting in the Anglo-American Political Systems.' In *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives*, ed. Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan. New York: The Free Press; Richard Rose, and Derek W. Urwin 1970. 'Persistence and Change in Western Party Systems Since 1945.' *Political Studies* 18:287-319; Richard Rose, Ed. 1974. *Electoral Behavior: A Comparative Handbook*. New York: The Free Press.
- ⁹ For Britain see David Butler and Donald Stokes. 1974. *Political Change in Britain*. 2nd Ed. London: Macmillan. On France see Michael Lewis-Beck and Andrew Skalaban. 'France.' In *Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries*. Eds. Mark Franklin, Tom Mackie, Henry Valen, et al. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. On Belgium see Anthony Mughan. 1983. 'Accommodation or diffusion in the management of ethnic conflict in Belgium.' *Political Studies* 31: 431-51.
- ¹⁰ Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. New York: Wiley. For more recent analysis suggesting the decline of the religious cleavage, but the continued stability of social alignments to explain American voting behavior, see C. Brooks and Jeff Manza. 1997. 'Social cleavages and political alignments: US presidential elections, 1960 to 1992.' *American Sociological Review* 62 (6): 937-946; C. Brooks and Jeff Manza. 1997. 'The religious factor in US presidential elections, 1960-1992.' *American Journal of Sociology* 103 (1): 38-81.
- ¹¹ Clyde Wilcox. 1992. *God's Warriors: The Christian Right in Twentieth Century America*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press; David C. Leege and Lyman A. Kellstedt. Eds. 1993. *Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American Politics*. New York: M. E. Sharpe.
- ¹² Irena Borowik. 2002. 'The Roman Catholic Church in the Process of Democratic Transformation: The case of Poland.' *Social Compass* 49(2): 239-252.
- ¹³ Ted Gerard Jelen and Clyde Wilcox. Eds. 2002. *Religion and Politics in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- ¹⁴ For a more recent argument that these stable patterns have persisted with considerable continuity displayed within the major 'left' and 'right' blocks, see Stephano Bartolini and Peter Mair. 1990. *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilization of European Electorates, 1885-1985*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- ¹⁵ Jerome M. Clubb, William H. Flanigan and Nancy H. Zingale. 1990. *Partisan Realignment: Voters, Parties and Government in American History*. Boulder, Co: Westview Press.
- ¹⁶ John Madeley. 1991. 'Politics and religion in Western Europe.' In *Politics and Religion in the Modern World*. Ed. George Moyser. London: Routledge; David Hanley. Ed. 1996. *Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative*

Perspective. New York: Pinter; Carolyn M. Warner. 2000. *Confessions of an interest group: The Catholic Church and political parties in Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Thomas Keselman and Joseph A. Buttigieg, Eds. 2003. *European Christian Democracy: Historical Legacies and Comparative Perspectives*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

¹⁷ David Butler and Donald E. Stokes. 1974. *Political Change in Britain: The Evolution of Electoral Choice*. 2d ed. London: Macmillan; Mark Franklin, Tom Mackie, Henry Valen, et al. 1992. *Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁸ Paul Mitchell, Brendan O'Leary and Geoffrey Evans. 2001. 'Northern Ireland: Flanking extremists bite the moderates and emerge in their clothes.' *Parliamentary Affairs* 54 (4): 725-742.

¹⁹ See, for example, George Moyser. Ed. 1991. *Politics and Religion in the Modern World*. Ed. London: Routledge; Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully. Eds. 2003. *Christian Democracy in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Regime Conflicts*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

²⁰ Ivor Crewe, Jim Alt and Bo Sarlvik. 1977. 'Partisan dealignment in Britain 1964-1974.' *British Journal of Political Science* 7: 129-90; Norman Nie, Sidney Verba and John Petrocik. 1976. *The Changing American Voter*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Ivor Crewe and David Denver. Eds. 1985. *Electoral Change in Western Democracies: Patterns and Sources of Electoral Volatility*. New York: St. Martin's Press; Mark Franklin, Tom Mackie, Henry Valen, et al. 1992. *Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Russell J. Dalton, Scott Flanagan, and Paul Allen Beck, Eds. 1984. *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment?* Princeton: Princeton University Press; Mark Franklin 1985. *The Decline of Class Voting in Britain: Changes in the Basis of Electoral Choice, 1964-1983*. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Jeff Manza and Clem Brooks. 1999. *Social Cleavages and Political Change: Voter Alignments and U.S. Party Coalitions*. New York: Oxford University Press; Terry Nichols Clark and Seymour Martin Lipset. Eds. 2001. *The Breakdown of Class Politics*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press.

²¹ Russell J. Dalton, Scott Flanagan, and Paul Allen Beck, Eds. 1984. *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment?* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

²² Hans Daalder and Peter Mair, Eds. 1985. *Western European Party Systems*. London: Sage; Morgens N. Pederson, 1979. 'The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility.' *European Journal of Political Research* 7:1-26; Herbert Kitschelt. Ed. 1995. *The Radical Right in Western Europe*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press; Pippa Norris. 2005. *Radical Right*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

²³ For more details, see Pippa Norris. 2005. *Radical Right*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

²⁴ Pippa Norris. 2000 *A Virtuous Circle? Political Communications in Post-Industrial Democracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; David Farrell and Rudiger Schmitt-Beck. Eds. 2002. *Do Political Campaigns Matter?* London: Routledge.

²⁵ Pippa Norris. 2003. *Electoral Engineering*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

²⁶ Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart. 2004. *Sacred and Secular*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

²⁷ R. Scott Appleby, Gabriel Almond, and Emmanuel Sivan. 2003. *Strong Religion*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

²⁸ Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart. 2004. *Sacred and Secular*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.