

The Rise of the “Traditionalist Alliance:”

Religion and Presidential Voter Coalitions, 1960-2004

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Many journalists and pundits rediscovered the political impact of religion in the 2004 presidential election (Green 2007). Their reporting and commentary focused largely on traditionally religious white Christians, variously described as the “religious right,” “fundamentalists,” or “conservative Christians.” These voters were credited—and blamed—for President Bush’s close reelection. Driven by “moral values” and anchoring one end of the “God gap” between religious and non-religious America, these voters seemed poised to play a dominant role in national politics. To many it appeared that a new era of faith-based elections had begun in dramatic fashion (Rozell and Das Gupta 2006).

Although this commentary was incomplete and often overstated, it contained an element of truth: traditionally religious white Christians did play a role in Bush’s reelection, and moreover, they were a good example of a relatively new kind of faith-based politics. For ease of discussion, the focus of this commentary can be called the “traditionalist alliance” within the Republican Party. The purpose of this essay is to describe this “traditionalist alliance” and related developments across the religious landscape, including among the Democrats. After a brief review of the relevant literature, the text describes the impact of religious groups in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections in some detail. Next it compares these elections to the 1960s, when another kind

of faith-based politics mattered at the ballot box. Then it traces the rise of the “traditionalist alliance” from 1960 to 2004, and ends with some speculation about the future.

Religion and American Voting Behavior

The impact of religion in the 2004 election may have surprised journalists and pundits, but the underlying patterns have been well-documented by social scientists. Indeed, scholars experienced their own “rediscovery” of the political impact of religion nearly three decades before, in the 1976 and 1980 presidential elections (Leege and Kellestedt 1993). Since then the literature has recorded a significant change in the nature of faith-based politics in presidential elections.

Historically, religious affiliation was the prime means by which religion influenced the vote in the United States. This pattern was common in the 19th century and through the middle of the 20th century (McCormick 1974). So, for example, in the 1940s members of northern, white Mainline Protestant denominations tended to vote Republican, while northern, white Roman Catholics tended to vote Democratic. Religious affiliation was often closely linked to race and ethnicity, so that the major political parties were in large part coalitions of “ethno-religious” groups (Kleppner 1979). Such coalitions differed somewhat from place to place and changed over time, but religious affiliation remained central to voter alignments. Franklin Roosevelt’s “New Deal” coalition and its Republican counterpart are perhaps the best known examples. This “old politics of belonging” has been usefully captured in survey research by denomination affiliation, aggregated into religious traditions (Green 2007).

By the late 1980s, scholars noticed that political differences based on traditional religious practices and beliefs were becoming common. For example, voters who claimed to attend worship once a week or more tended to vote more Republican, while the less observant tended to vote more Democratic. These divisions appeared within many religious traditions. As a consequence, the Republican and Democratic voter coalitions acquired new elements, with the GOP gaining support from the traditionally religious in various religious communities and the Democrats picking up support from the less traditionally religious across the religious landscape. Secularization contributed to these new divisions as well, both within religious traditions in the form of the nominally religious, and outside of religious traditions in the form of the unaffiliated population.

This “new politics of behaving and believing” has been usefully captured in survey research by the extent of traditional religious behaviors and beliefs (Green 2007). Different terms have been used for the new religious elements in these rival alliances, including “conservatives” or “fundamentalists” versus “liberals,” or the “orthodox” and “progressive.” Unfortunately, many of these terms also have political meanings and thus risk confusing the religious underpinning of politics with politics itself. Although no labels are perfect, the terms “traditionalist” and “modernist” are useful for the task at hand (Layman and Green 2005).

Robert Wuthnow insightfully described these developments as the “restructuring” of American religion (Wuthnow 1988; 1989; 1996). The source of this restructuring was found in part within religious communities themselves, the results of theological innovations and institutional responses to social change. But these divisions were also fostered from outside of religious communities by changes in the political agenda,

especially the appearance of new cultural issues, such as abortion and gay rights. Such issues were promoted by a new “special purpose” groups within religious traditions (Wuthnow 1988) as well as broader social movements on the “left” (women’s and gay rights movements) and the “right” (the Christian Right and pro-life movements) (Freeman and Johnson 1999).

The prominence of cultural conflict in these new developments led James Davison Hunter to described them in terms of “culture wars” (Hunter 1991; 1994), arguing that the rival groups differed on basic conceptions of moral authority. The logic of the underlying conflict would make disputes based in traditional religiosity the dominant linkage between religion and politics, eventually replacing political differences based on religious affiliation altogether. This “culture war thesis” sparked extensive debate among social scientists over the depth and comprehensiveness of these new divisions in the mass public (Himmelfarb 2001; Wolfe 1998; Fiorina et al. 2005; Williams 1997).

Despite these disagreements over the meaning of the “culture wars,” there was some agreement on its immediate consequences of these changes at the ballot box, with some scholars describing the results as a “diminishing divide” (Kohut et al. 2000) from the perspective of the old faith-based order, a “great divide” (Layman 2001) from the perspective of the new faith-based order, and the evolution of “the politics of cultural differences” from a longer historical perspective (Leege et al. 2002). One thing the disputants could agree upon was that cultural conflict was especially prominent among political leaders and activists, a fact documented by extensive research (Wilcox and Larson 2006; Green et al. 1996).

A Look at the Present: Religion and the Presidential Vote, 2000-2004

How did the situation stand at the beginning of the Twenty-first Century? Table 1 reports on the voting behavior of major religious communities in the “Bush era,” pooling two surveys, conducted in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections. These surveys have extensive measures of religion and allow for the identification of twenty-two categories based on religious belonging, behaving, and believing (see the appendix for more details on these surveys and the categories).

The basic building block for these religious categories is denominational affiliation, aggregated into religious traditions. Within the three largest religious traditions (white Evangelical and Mainline Protestants and Catholics), four subdivisions were defined by the extent of traditional religious behaviors and beliefs: “traditionalists” (with the most traditional practices and beliefs), “modernists” (non-traditional practices and beliefs), “centrists” (falling between the first two categories), and “nominals” (reporting no religious behaviors or beliefs but retaining an affiliation). The fourth large religious grouping, the Unaffiliated, was subdivided in an analogous fashion into “Unaffiliated Believers” (reporting religious practices and beliefs), “Atheists and Agnostics” (self-identified), and “Seculars” (reporting no religious practices or beliefs).

Some religious traditions were too small to be subdivided in this fashion (Jews) and others were ever smaller and had to be combined into composite categories (Other Christians, Other Faiths). However, there is reason to believe that many of these religious communities are also characterized by the traditionalist-nominal divisions (Green 2007, chapter 2). In addition, some of the categories were defined in part by race (Black Protestants) or ethnicity (Latino Protestants and Catholics) to recognize contemporary

ethno-religious communities. Differences based on religious practice and belief mattered less within these groups, a point illustrated by the partition of Black Protestants into “traditionalist” and “less traditional” categories in Table 1.

Religious Groups and the Presidential Vote 2000-2004. The left-hand portion of Table 1 lists the religious categories in order of the Bush portion of the two-party vote in the 2000 and 2004 election combined (for information on the separate results of the 2000 and 2004 elections, see Green et al. 2007). The first five groups listed were the strongest Bush supporters, voting more than two-thirds Republican in these very close elections. These categories are the heart of the “traditionalist alliance” in the GOP, including Traditionalist Evangelicals, Mainliners, and Catholics. The Other Christians is a composite group that includes Mormons and the Eastern Orthodox, both of which score relatively high on traditional practice and belief. The final category was Centrist Evangelicals, more moderate in religious terms than their traditionalist co-religionists, but still quite traditional compared to the public at large.

Traditionalist Evangelicals are the core constituency for the “religious right” and as such have received a great deal of attention by the news media as well as scholars (Wilcox and Larson 2006). They are central to the “rediscovery” faith-based politics in 2004 as well as the “culture war” debates, and are important in the political “restructuring” of religion. But it is worth noting that Traditionalist Evangelicals are at best a large minority of the electorate (see the far right hand column for the relative size of these groups among voters).

[Table 1 about here]

The next four categories were weak Bush supporters, having voted Republican by slim margins in these elections. The first two were Nominal and Modernist Evangelicals. The former are the only instance in Table 1 where a “nominal” group was more Republican than a “modernist” group.¹ Still, note that the Nominal and Modernist Evangelicals voted much less Republican than their Traditionalist and Centrist co-religionists. Bush prevailed with the remaining two groups, Centrist Catholics and Centrist Mainline Protestants, by the slimmest of margins. These religiously “moderate” white Christians were classic “swing voters” and the subject of intense campaigning in these elections. The Centrist Catholics went for Bush both times, but in 2004 the Centrist Mainliners slipped into the Democratic column.

The next two groups were weak supporters of the Democratic presidential candidates in 2000-2004. Modernist Mainline Protestants have been moving in a Democratic direction for some time (see Figure 2 below). Latino Protestants were also on balance Democratic in these elections, but Bush won a solid majority in 2004. It is unclear, however, if this change represents a short or long term shift.² But in any event, Latino Protestants are far more Republican than Latino Catholics.

All the remaining groups were strong Democratic supporters in these elections. The first three voted less than two-thirds Democratic, including Modernist Catholics, Nominal Mainline Protestants, and Seculars. The next group in Table 1, Unaffiliated Believers, actually voted more Republican than Seculars in 2004.

The last eight categories in Table 1 were the strongest Democratic supporters, and having voted two-thirds or more for the Democratic candidates in these two elections,

¹ The reason for this pattern was a surge in support for Bush among Evangelicals in 2004 (see Green et al. 2007).

² In the 2006 congressional elections, Latino Protestants vote majority Democratic.

they are the counterpart to the strongest Bush supporters at the top of the Table 1. These categories are quite diverse, including less traditional and non-religious groups as well as religious minorities: Nominal and Latino Catholics, Other Faiths, Atheists and Agnostics, and Jews. The highest Democratic vote was found in the two Black Protestant categories. Note that there was almost no difference between Traditionalist Black Protestants and their less traditional co-religionists in the 2000-2004 pooled data. However, Bush did especially poorly among Black Protestants in 2000 and better in 2004. To some extent these data confirm the “restructuring” argument and fit with the “culture wars” thesis.

One way to summarize the patterns in the left-hand columns in Table 1 is to calculate a “religion gap” in the Bush vote between pairs of religious categories. For example, the different between Traditionalist Evangelicals (87.6 percent) and Less Traditional Black Protestants (20 percent) was 77.6 percentage points—a huge gap by any estimation. Of course, this comparison involves the complicating fact of race,³ but other gaps are also instructive: the gap between Traditionalist Evangelicals and Seculars was 53.5 percentage points, and between Traditionalist and Nominal Catholics the gap was 37.8 percent. As a point of comparison, the much discussed “gender gap” was 13.6 percentage points in these data. Thus, these religious categories were highly polarized in terms of the two-party presidential vote in these close elections.

Presidential Voter Coalitions 2000-2004. The right-hand portion of Table 1 looks at the relative importance of these religious categories to the total ballots received by Bush and his Democratic rivals. Traditionalist Evangelicals were the single largest source of votes for Bush in these elections, accounting for 23.8 percent. If Centrist Evangelicals were included, then the Evangelical portion of the “traditionalist alliance” made up 34.7

³ The gap between all blacks and whites was 45.2 percentage points in these surveys.

percent of the GOP total. Thus, claims about the importance of Evangelicals to the Bush campaigns have some basis in fact. But note that Traditionalist Evangelicals provided Bush with fewer votes than the other elements of the “traditionalist alliance” combined (30.5 percent). All told, the “traditionalist alliance” supplied a solid majority of the Republican vote in these close elections (54.4 percent).

The weak Bush supporters supplied another 17.7 of all Bush’s ballots. Thus, the religious categories where Bush prevailed supplied nearly three-quarters of his vote total in these elections. This means that more than one-quarter of the Bush ballots came from groups that on balance voted for the Democratic candidates. Of particular importance was the 5.0 percent from the Seculars, 3.8 percent from Modernist Mainline, and 2.0 percent from Latino Protestants. In addition, Bush received more than one-tenth of all his votes from the strongest Democratic supporters. None of these numbers were trivial in elections where the difference in the national two-party popular vote was one percent or less. So while the “traditionalist alliance” was crucial to Bush, he was reelected by a much broader coalition of voters—and only just barely.

What about the Democratic presidential candidates in these elections? The single largest source of Democratic votes was the Seculars, at 9.8 percent. But if the Unaffiliated Believers, Atheists and Agnostics are added in, 19.8 percent of the Democratic ballots came from the Unaffiliated. Thus there is also some truth to the claim that non-religious people were important to the Democrats in these elections. However, in 2000 and 2004 the Democratic candidates did not get the quite same level of support from these constituencies as Bush received from the “traditionalist alliance.”

The second largest source of Democratic votes was Black Protestants, which combined for another 15.7 percent of all the Democratic ballots. If Latinos were added to this figure, the contribution from minority Christians swells to 22.3 percent of the Democratic total. The modernist and nominal groups made up another 14.2 percent of the Democratic votes, while Jews and Other Faiths contributed another 8.8 percent. All told, religious groups in which the Democratic candidates prevailed accounted for 65.1 of all the Democratic ballots.

More than one-third of the Democratic candidates' votes came from religious communities that on balance voted for Bush. The Democrats received 17.5 percent of all their ballots from weak Bush supporters, a figure that reflects the close division of these religious categories at the polls. However, the Democrats also received 17.5 percent of their ballots from religious groups in the "traditionalist alliance," including 3.8 percent from Traditionalist Evangelicals. Thus, one reason the Democratic candidates were so competitive in these elections was the votes they received from Republican religious constituencies.

Religion and Other Demographic Factors in 2000-2004. The voting behavior of these religious groups raises an important question: do these patterns derive from a distinctive religious perspective or from the other demographic characteristics of these religious communities? This question is addressed in Table 2, which reports the results of a logistic regression analysis of the Bush vote, using standard demographic variables and these religious categories (Modernist Catholics and Mainline Protestants were the excluded categories; see appendix for details of the analysis).

[Table 2 about here]

The statistical significance and signs of the coefficients are the easiest features of Table 2 to interpret. The demographic variables were all statistically significant and each had the sign one might expect based on the voting behavior literature (Miller and Shanks 1996): higher income, Southern region, and married-never-divorced were all positively associated with the Bush vote, while higher levels of education, female gender, and increased age were all negatively associated. Note that most of the religious categories were also statistically significant in this analysis, especially the strongest Bush and Democratic candidate supporters. Indeed, the religious categories that were not statistically significant were those closely divided between Bush and his rivals.

These patterns suggest that the links between religion and the vote were not simply the product of the other demographic factors in the analysis, but rather that religion and other social traits all made independent contributions to the presidential vote in these elections. This indication is strengthened when these coefficients are converted into the probability of voting for Bush. For example, when income was set at the mean value of the sample, the predicted Bush vote increases for most religious groups, but the basic pattern in Table 1 persists. Similar results obtained for the other demographic variables.⁴

A clearer illustration of these patterns is in found in Table 3, which displays the Bush vote for lower income (less than \$50,000 in annual family income) and higher income (more than \$50,000) members of each religious category. (This table also reports the percentage of each group that had higher income (the first column of the left) and

⁴ These demographic factors operated at cross purposes for many voters. For example, higher income and being married moved the vote in a Republican direction, but higher levels of education and being a woman helped the Democrats. All else being equal, a married, affluent female lawyer living in Denver might have been as conflicted about voting for Bush as an unmarried, less affluent male bricklayer residing in Tupelo Mississippi.

calculates an “income gap” in the Bush vote for each religious category (the last column on the right); the Bush vote from Table 1 is included for purposes of comparison.

[Table 3 about here]

First, note the uneven distribution of higher income voters by the religion categories: higher income groups were found across the partisan spectrum, including Jews (68.3 percent), Nominal Mainliners (64.3 percent), Centrist Catholics (60.9 percent), and Traditionalist Evangelicals (50.0 percent). Lower income voters were also dispersed, including Less Traditional Black Protestants (20.8 percent), Latino Protestants (27.7 percent), Nominal Evangelicals (37.2 percent), and Other Christians (37.1 percent). Interestingly, the mean percentage of higher income voters for the strongest Republican (45.9 percent) and Democratic (45.1 percent) supporters was about equal to the sample figure of 46.6 percent.⁵

Note that the “income gap” in the Bush vote was positive for Traditionalist Evangelicals and the strongest Bush supporters—meaning that higher income members of these groups were more likely to vote Republican than their lower income co-religionists. This pattern also held for the weak Bush supporters, Centrist Mainline Protestants and Catholics (the income gap for the latter was especially large)—and also for Black Protestants and Latino Catholics. The exceptions to this pattern were a bit idiosyncratic, including some groups that had voted more Democratic (Jews and Unaffiliated Believers) and some that voted more Republican (Latino Protestants and Nominal Evangelicals). Put another way, Bush lost votes even among his strongest

⁵ One of the factors at work here is the class bias in voter turnout, with higher income people in all religious communities being more likely to cast a ballot. Interestingly, regular worship attenders are also more likely to vote than less frequent attenders.

religious supporters due to lower income—and he picked up some votes because of higher income even in strong Democratic constituencies.

Partisanship and Issues in 2000-2004. The presidential vote is determined by more than just demography, of course, and factors such as partisanship and issue positions are often important.⁶ Table 4 reports the results of a logistic regression analysis of the Bush vote when party identification, cultural and social welfare issue positions are included along with demography and the religious categories (see appendix for details of the variable construction).

[Table 4 about here]

The results of this analysis are straightforward: Republican partisanship, cultural and social welfare conservatism was each positively associated with the Bush vote in these data. These political attitudes eliminate the independent impact of most of the religious categories—and the impact of most of the other demographic variables as well. Just two pairs of religious categories remained statistically significant: Traditionalist and Centrist Evangelicals for the GOP, Latino Catholics and Black Protestants for the Democrats. Education and age also remained statistically significant.

Without exception, the Republicans, cultural and social welfare conservatives in each of the religious categories voted more for Bush than their co-religionists who did not have these attitudes. Table 5 reports each religious category's mean score on Republicanism, cultural and social welfare conservatism. As one might expect, the strongest Bush supporters tended to identify with the GOP, with a mean score of 53.0 percent, 11.1 percentage points above the sample as a whole (41.9 percent). Here the

⁶ One reason that demography matters to the vote is that it generates support for issues. In the classic formulation, income is associated with views toward social welfare due to class interest. Similarly, religion is thought to generate issue positions reflective of the values taught to the faithful.

Traditionalist Evangelicals were the most Republican (63.3 percent) and Other Christians the least (50.4 percent). The weak Bush supporters were much less Republican, with an average of 39.2 percent, in part due to the modest Republicanism of the Nominal Evangelicals (29.9) and Centrist Mainline (37.2 percent). The weak Democratic supporters showed a similar pattern.

[Table 5 about here]

Not surprisingly, the strongest supporters of Democratic presidential candidates tended to *not* identify with the Republicans, with the mean score being 30.0 percent, 11.9 percentage points below the sample mean. The least Republican group was Black Protestants and the most Republican group was Nominal Catholics. These data reveal that each of the major political parties has strong religious constituencies, with some religious communities aligned with neither party. These patterns reflect a “restructuring” of party coalitions as well, with the new religious divisions integrated into partisan conflict.

The patterns for cultural conservatism in Table 5 closely resemble the findings for partisanship. The strongest Bush supporters tended toward the right by this measure, with a mean of 53.4 percent, 13.6 percentage points higher than entire sample. True to form, Traditionalist Evangelicals scored highest (with 66.9 percent), while Traditionalist Mainline and Centrist Evangelicals scored lowest (about 47 percent). The weak Bush supporters were less culturally conservative (a mean of 35.0 percent), a pattern shared by the weak Democratic supporters (36.9 percent).

In contrast, the strong Democratic supporters tended to be cultural liberals, with a mean score of 31.9 percent. However, this figure was inflated by a few exceptions, such as Traditionalist Black Protestants (53 percent). If this one group were excluded, the

mean drops to 27.4 percent, 12.4 percentage points below the sample mean. These data suggest that cultural issues are an important factor in the new religious elements in both party's coalitions. These data provide some support for the "culture war thesis," but also reveal the limits of its application (Layman and Green 2005).⁷

A similar but more modest pattern appears for social welfare conservatism. The strongest Bush supporters tended toward the right, with a mean score of 53.2 percent, 4.2 percentage points higher than the sample as a whole (49.0 percent). The weak Bush and Democratic candidate supporters scored close to the sample mean on this measure. Meanwhile, the strong Democratic supporters tended toward the left, with a mean of 44.7 percent, 4.3 percentage points below the sample mean. These figures suggest that social welfare was somewhat less central to the religious elements of party coalitions in these elections.

What about foreign policy? The Bush foreign policy cannot be analyzed with the 2000-2004 pooled data because it did not take effect until after the 2000 election. However, some data are available for the Iraq War in 2004 and they are reported in Table 6 (see appendix for details). This question was asked in spring of 2004 when the Iraq war was still popular with the electorate, a pattern that has changed substantially since then.⁸ Nonetheless, the pattern in Table 6 is striking: the strongest Bush supporters, led by Traditionalist Evangelicals, were 16.2 percentage points more likely to support the war than the entire sample. In contrast, the strongest supporters of John Kerry were 16.2 percentage points less supportive of the war than the sample as a whole. The weak Bush and Kerry supporters hewed close to the sample figure.

⁷ In the 2000-2004 data, the issue of affirmative action behaved like a measure of social welfare.

⁸ See Pew Research Center. "Trends in Public Opinion about War in Iraq, 2003-2007" <http://people-press.org/commentary/display.php3?AnalysisID=154>.

[Table 6 about here]

It is not clear how best to interpret these foreign policy data. On the one hand, these patterns are partly a product of partisanship: the patterns in Table 6 closely parallel the Republican scores in Table 5 and the Iraq War was one of President Bush's most salient policies. But on the other hand, these new foreign policy issues may reflect a new source of political conflict and polarization, with religious communities taking positions on these matters for substantive reasons (Guth et al. 2005). Some scholars see foreign policy disputes as functioning in a fashion analogous to cultural issues in American politics (Shafer 2003).

Summary. Taken together, all these findings reveal several things. First, there was considerable evidence for the “restructuring” of American religion in 2000-2004 presidential vote, with traditionalists tending to vote more Republican than the centrists, modernists, or nominals. The “traditionalist alliance” in the GOP is the best example of this phenomenon, but the Democrats also benefited from the modernist, nominal, and non-religious elements of their coalition.

Second, religious traditions still mattered politically. Note that Evangelicals were more Republican than Mainline Protestants and Catholics, and traces of the ancestral partisanship of Mainliners and Catholics was still evident. Religious tradition was especially strong among religious minorities, especially where race and ethnicity were part of religious identity. Cultural issues were an important reason for these connections, providing some support for the “culture wars,” while social welfare issues were less importance. Foreign policy questions may also be an important factor in the future.

Third, these patterns do not appear to be the product of other demographic factors, but instead reflect in large part the independent contribution of religion to the vote. One result was the polarization of many religious groups in presidential voting with each party having core religious constituencies and also competing vigorously for the support of religious groups that lacked firm connections to either party.

A Look Back: Religion and Presidential Voting in 1960 and 1964

How do the connections between religion and the vote in the Twenty-first century differ from the past? This question can be addressed with a survey conducted in 1964 with a large number of religion questions (see appendix for a description). Although this survey did not ask the same questions as the 2000-2004 surveys, a cautious comparison is possible. Of course, differences in survey questions is only one of the many problems associated with over time comparisons: the United State was very different place in the 1960s, both in religious and political terms. As in 2000 and 2004, the 1960 presidential contest between Democrat John F. Kennedy and Republican Richard Nixon was very close (with Kennedy winning with just over 50 percent of the two-party popular vote), but 1964 was not close at all, with Democrat Lyndon Johnson defeating Republican Barry Goldwater by a huge landslide (61 percent of the two-party vote).⁹

Using the same approach as with the 2000-2004 survey data, fourteen religious categories were created for the 1960s data. On a positive note, this procedure generated comparable measures of traditionalists, centrists, and modernists among white Evangelicals, Mainline, and Catholics. On a negative note, the Latino population and the

⁹ Both of these elections were important from the perspective of religion and politics, with the first (and only) Catholic elected president in 1960 and the political stirrings of conservative Christians in opposition to communism in 1964 (Wilcox 1999).

nominal Christians were not numerous enough in these data to create separate categories and data inadequacies prevented creating sub-categories among the Unaffiliated and Black Protestants (see the appendix for the details of these measures).

Religious Groups and the 1960 Presidential Vote. Tables 7a (1960) and 7b (1964) are similar to Table 1, with the left-hand portion reporting the presidential vote of the relevant religious categories. Likewise, the right-hand side of these tables reports the relative importance of these religious categories to the total ballots received by the Republican and Democratic presidential candidates. In each of these tables, the religious groups are listed in order of the Republican share of the two-party vote.

For the 1960 election, Table 7a shows that the first four groups were the strongest Nixon supporters, having voted two-thirds or more Republican. The strongest Nixon backers were the Modernist Mainline Protestants (75.5 percent), followed by Traditionalist Evangelicals (71.1 percent), Centrist Mainliners (67.2 percent), and Traditionalist Mainliners (67.0 percent). Thus all the Mainline Protestant groups were found among the strongest Republican constituencies in 1960--a dramatic difference from 2000-2004, when only the Traditionalist Mainline was among the Bush backers. Interestingly, Traditionalist Evangelicals were also among the top Nixon categories, although they voted some 16 percentage points less than for Bush in 2000-2004.

[Table 7a about here]

The next four groups were strong Nixon supporters, giving him a solid majority over Kennedy. These categories include the Modernist and Centrist Evangelicals, plus the Other Christians and the Other Faiths. The relative position of the first two groups looks a bit like 2000-2004, but the Centrist Evangelicals and Other Christians differ dramatically.

It is hard to know what to make of the Other Faiths category, which was among the strongest Democratic constituencies in 2000-2004, except to note that the content of this composite category changed considerably between 1960 and 2000.¹⁰

The remaining six categories were strong Kennedy supporters, all voting two-thirds or more Democratic. Note that all three Catholic groups were among the strongest Democratic constituencies in 1960, reflecting special support for their co-religionist at the top of the Democratic ticket. This pattern is quite different from 2000-2004, when only the Modernist Catholics were found among the strong Democratic constituencies (although the Nominal Catholics were among the strongest Democratic supporters in 2000-2004). Meanwhile, the Traditionalist Catholics were among Bush's strongest supporters. Some groups voted in a similar fashion: Black Protestants and Jews were the strongest Democratic voters in 1960, occupying roughly the same relative position as in 2000-2004. The Unaffiliated were also in the Democratic camp in 1960 with similar relative positions as 2000-2004.

A good way to summarize the 1960 patterns is to compare Modernist Mainline Protestants to Modernist Catholics, two groups characterized by less traditional practices and beliefs. In Table 7a there was a 54.8 percentage-point gap in the Nixon vote between these groups, a gap about the size of the gap between Traditionalist Evangelicals and Seculars in 2000-2004. (In 1960, the gap between Traditionalist Evangelicals and the Unaffiliated was 37.3 percentage points).

Presidential Voter Coalitions in 1960. The right-hand columns in Table 7a reveal that the major party candidates assembled different kinds of voter coalitions in 1960. For the Republicans, two-thirds of all Nixon's ballots came from the four strongest

¹⁰ The key difference was the increase in Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists.

constituencies, and more than one-half of these from Mainline Protestants. If the four strong GOP supporters are added in, then religious groups that Nixon won provided better than four-fifths of all his voters. Nixon received the final one-sixth of his votes from strong Democratic groups, and about one-tenth of this total from Catholics.

The Democratic coalition was organized a little differently. The six strongest Democratic constituencies provided Kennedy with just about three-fifths of all his ballots, and Catholics more than one-third of his ballots overall all. Kennedy drew about one-tenth of his votes from the strong Nixon constituencies, and more than one-quarter of his support from the strongest Nixon constituencies. Indeed, the key to Kennedy's victory may well have been the roughly one-quarter of his ballots that came from Mainline Protestants, the mainstay of the GOP in that era. On the other hand, if Nixon had either limited Kennedy's Mainline Protestant vote--or obtained a comparable proportion of the Catholic vote—he might well have won the election.

Religious Groups and the 1964 Presidential Vote. Table 7b provides the same data for 1964, and the left-hand columns show a variation of the 1960 patterns. For one thing, Goldwater lost the election by a large margin, so his four strongest supporters all gave him less than three-fifths of their votes (but still solid majorities). The top two groups were Modernist and Traditionalist Evangelicals, both at 57.6 percent, a figure that was less than their vote for Nixon in 1960. The composite Other Faiths voted Republican at about the same rate as four-years before, but rose in the relative rankings because of GOP loses in other groups.

Chief among the Republican loses were Mainline Protestants: all three groups voted Republican at a substantially lower rate than in 1960. This shift put Modernist

Mainliners at the low end of the strongest Goldwater supporters (but still with a solid majority), and put Centrist and Traditionalist Mainliners among the weak Goldwater supporters (with very slim majorities). Meanwhile, Centrist Evangelicals slipped into the Democratic camp by a modest amount as well. Here, too, the patterns are quite different from 2000-2004, although the even division of Centrist Mainliners also occurred in the most recent elections.

Meanwhile, Johnson enjoyed strong support from Kennedy's strongest supporters, with seven in ten or more voting Democratic. Catholics voted strongly for Johnson and at a rate only slightly lower than for Kennedy. Meanwhile, Black Protestants, Jews, and the Unaffiliated increased their Democratic vote over 1960. The composite category of Other Christians switched sides, from a majority for Nixon to three-fifths for Johnson. It is worth noting that although these changes reduced the Republican vote gap between the rival groups, it did not eliminate it. For instance, the gap between Modernist Mainliners and Catholics was 32.1 percentage points and the gap between Traditionalist Evangelicals and the Unaffiliated was 28.5 percentage points.

Presidential Voter Coalitions in 1964. The right-hand columns in Table 7b show the impact of these changes on the major party voter coalitions. Goldwater's strongest supporters provided only one-third of all his ballots, while his weak supporters supplied another one-third as well. So, the religious groups Goldwater won combined for two-thirds of his vote total. The remaining one-third came from religious groups that voted on balance Democratic.

In contrast, Johnson's strongest constituencies supplied more than one-half of all his ballots, and if his weak supporters were included, religious groups that Johnson won

provide more than three-fifths of his total. One-fifth of his ballots came from weak Goldwater supporters and another one-sixth from the strongest Republican constituencies. In sum, the Goldwater coalition was an attenuated version of the Nixon coalition of 1960 and Johnson had an expanded version of Kennedy's. These patterns resemble the coalitions of 2000-2004 in that race and ethnicity played a major role, but differed sharply on the impact of traditional religiosity.

Religion and Other Demographic Factors in the 1960s. What about the impact of other demographic factors on the Republican vote in 1960 and 1964? Table 8 is the counterpart to Table 2, reporting the results of a logistic regression of the Nixon and Goldwater vote using standard demographic factors and religious groups (the Centrist Evangelicals were the excluded category in both years; see appendix for details).

[Table 8 about here]

The findings in Table 8 are a little different than in Table 2. For example, just one of the Republican religious groups retained statistically significant coefficients once the effects of other demographic factors were controlled, and that was Traditionalist Evangelicals. However, on the Democratic side, all of the strongest Democratic groups remained statistically significant in 1960 and 1964 (and in the latter, Other Christians were significant as well). So, the religious groups that were central to the Democratic coalition voted less Republican even when demography was taken into account.

The demographic factors also showed different patterns in the 1960s. Greater Education and age were significant both election, and unlike 2000-2004, each was positively associated with the Republican presidential vote. Higher income was also positively associated with the GOP vote, but was only significant in 1964. And unlike

2000-2004, marital status was not statistically significant in either year. Neither was gender in 1960, but it became significant in 1964--and was negatively associated with the Republican vote. Southern region was significant in both years: in 1960 it was negatively associated with the GOP vote, but in 1964 it was positively associated with it. These findings suggest that the eventual “restructuring” of religion and the advent of the “culture wars” occurred in the context of broader demographic change.

Religion, Partisanship and Issues in the 1960s. What role did partisanship and issues play in the 1960 and 1964 elections? The survey used contains a measure of party identification as well as attitudes on cultural and social welfare issues. However, reflecting in part changes in the political agenda, the question wording was quite different from 2000-2004 (see appendix for details). Because of these differences the results must be interpreted with extreme caution. In a fashion analogous to Table 4, Table 9 reports logistic regression analysis of the Republican presidential vote that adds partisanship, cultural and social welfare issues to demography and the religious categories.

[Table 9 about here]

Despite the difference in the measures, the impact of these political attitudes on the vote was similar to the 2000-2004 elections. First, Republican partisanship had a positive and statistically significant impact on the Nixon and Goldwater vote. Similarly, cultural conservatism was positively and significantly associated with the GOP vote. Social welfare conservatism was also positively associated with the Republican vote, but was not statistically significant in 1960.

Unlike 2004, most of the impact of the demographic variables withstood the controls for political attitudes, with the only important change being Southern region,

which becomes non-significant in 1960. Fewer religious groups retained an independent impact on the presidential vote under these controls. In 1960, only one of the Republican constituencies retained statistical significance, with Modernist Mainline Protestants replacing Traditionalist Evangelicals. Something similar happened in 1964, but with Modernist Evangelicals replacing Traditionalist Evangelicals. Meanwhile, all of the strongest Democratic constituencies retained an independent impact on the vote in 1960, but in 1964 just two Democratic constituencies had this status, Black Protestants and Jews.

As in 2000-2004, Republicans, cultural and social welfare conservatives in each of the religious categories voted more for Nixon and Goldwater than their co-religionists who did not have these attitudes. As in Table 5, Table 10 reports the incidence of these political attitudes by religious categories, but here the religious groups are listed in order of their mean Republican vote in 1960 and 1964.

[Table 10 about here]

The strong Republican religious constituencies in 1960 and 1964 were more Republican than the electoral as whole, averaging 48.7 percent, 13.1 percentage points above the sample figure (35.6 percent). Note that the three Mainline Protestant groups had the strongest Republican identification, while the two groups of Evangelicals (and the Other Faiths) were less Republican, but more so than the sample as a whole. Meanwhile, the Centrist Evangelicals and Other Christians were about as Republican as the entire sample. In contrast, the Democratic religious constituencies were markedly less Republican, averaging 18.4 percent, 17.2 percentage points below the sample figure.

Cultural conservatism was less connected to the presidential vote than in 2000-2004. Indeed, the mean percentage of cultural conservatives among the Republican constituencies was 45.0, about the same as the sample figure of 43.9, while the average for the Democratic constituencies was 37.6 percent, just a little below the sample figure. But there were some interesting deviations: Traditionalist Evangelicals were especially conservative in this regard (58.3 percent) as were the Other Christians (58.5 percent), Centrist Evangelicals (51.9 percent) and Centrist Mainliners (49.4 percent). Traditionalist Catholics scored highest among the Democratic groups (44.7 percent). Meanwhile, all the modernists scored lower (a mean of 35.9 percent). Interestingly, Black Protestants scored a relatively low 31.2 percent, a major difference with 2000-2004. Thus while there is some indications of the 2000-2004 “culture war” patterns in these figures, cultural issues were not an important electoral division in 1960 and 1964.¹¹

Social welfare conservatism divided the religious categories more than cultural conservatism in 1960 and 1964, but in a modest fashion similar to 2000-2004. The mean economic conservatism of the Goldwater supporters was 59.2 percent, 2.8 percentage points above the sample figure of 56.4 percent. A major exception was Traditionalist Mainline Protestants (53 percent). If this one group were excluded, the average for the strongest Goldwater constituencies was 60.8 percent, 4.4 percentage points above the sample figure. Note that the Centrist Evangelicals and Other Christians also had high conservatism scores as well. Meanwhile, the Democratic religious constituencies were less conservative, with a mean score of 51.1 percent, 5.3 percentage points below the

¹¹ Race was an important issue in 1964, with Republican religious constituencies adopting conservative positions and Democratic religious constituencies taking liberal position. Civil rights was a more powerful partisan cleavage than morality or social welfare.

sample figure. There were exceptions here as well, such as the Catholics, whose scores closely resembled those of the evangelicals on social welfare conservatism.¹²

Summary. Taken together, this evidence from the 1960s provides a sharp contrast to 2000-2004. First, the “restructuring” of religion had not happened yet, and the religious voter alignments were largely ethno-religious coalitions. Here the best example was the 1960 election, where the Nixon coalition was dominated by white Protestants and the Kennedy coalition was made up of white Catholics and a collection of religious minorities. The 1964 coalitions were variations on this theme, disturbed by the special circumstances of that campaign.

Second, traditional religiosity had little effect on the presidential vote in 1960 and 1964. Indeed, there was not “traditionalist” alliance among Republicans in these elections, no indication of a “modernist” counterpart among the Democrats. The Democrats did have an unaffiliated constituency, but it was fairly small. To be sure, one can see some modest basis for the religious “restructuring” in these election findings as well as the “culture wars,” including the tendency of traditionalists to be concerned with the nation’s morals. But such cultural issues do not appear to have been central to voter coalitions as they would be forty years later. In contrast, partisanship and social welfare issues showed a similar association with the vote in both eras.

Third, other demographic factors appear to have played a large role in the 1960s than in 2000-2004. The demographic controls were especially strong with regard to the strongest Republican religious constituencies, suggesting that these religious communities were tightly bound to critical elements of the social structure. However, the

¹² The Vietnam War was underway in 1960 and 1964 and it was a highly partisan issue. As in 2004, the Republican constituencies supported a more aggressive approach to the war, while Democratic religious constituencies preferred a less aggressive approach.

demographic controls had less of an impact on the Democratic religious constituencies, who maintained a political impact independent of other social traits. This fact contributed to political polarization, as in the 1960 election, but such polarization was largely by religious traditions and not by religious traditionalism.

The Path of Change, 1960-2004

If the “traditionalist alliance” was not present in the Republican presidential vote of the 1960s, but was an important factor in President Bush’s voter coalition in 2000-2004, when did it appear? This is a difficult question to answer with precision, given the absence of consistent survey measures over the forty-year period in question. However, a crude measure of religious traditionalists and modernists was developed from a variety of sources and the results are displayed in the figures that follow (see appendix for details). Because of the measurement differences, the time series data points are not exactly the same as the other surveys used here, but the overall patterns are similar (for other time series analyses of this period, see Kohut et al 2000, and Layman 2001).

As a point of reference, the Republican presidential vote is included in each of the figures (the dark dotted line) because the Republican fortunes over this period are important to the emergence of the “traditionalist alliance.” The series begins with the GOP presidential candidates receiving about one-half of the two-party vote in 1960 and it ends with Bush obtaining a little more than one-half of the two-party vote in 2004. Low points occurred in 1964 (the Johnson landslide), 1976 (Carter’s election), 1992 and 1996 (Clinton’s election and re-election), and the high points occurred in 1972 and 1984 (Nixon and Reagan landslides).

Figure 1 plots this crude estimate for Traditionalist Evangelicals (the solid dark line), Mainline (the dashed line), and Catholics (the dashed and dotted line) from 1960 to 2004. In 1960, the Traditionalist Evangelicals were solidly in the Republican camp, with their support for the GOP declining in 1964 (note), but then rising to 1972. Their Republican support dropped a bit in 1976, when fellow Evangelical Jimmy Carter secured a narrow victory, peaking again with Ronald Reagan. And after another pause in 1988, Traditionalist Evangelicals continued in the Republican direction to 2004, so that by 1992, they had become a strong Republican constituency.

[Figure 1 about here]

The other major elements of the “traditionalist alliance” followed different paths. Traditionalist Mainline Protestants paralleled the Traditionalist Evangelicals until 1976, when they remained strongly Republican. After 1984 their GOP support waned until 1996, when it began a slow increase. But by the 1990s, Traditionalist Mainliners were less Republican than their Evangelical counterparts. Meanwhile, Traditionalist Catholics showed a fairly steady movement toward the GOP over the period. Starting solidly in the Democratic camp, this group took steps in a Republican direction in 1972, 1980 and 1992, with steps back in-between. However, after 1992 Traditionalist Catholics slowly became more Republican, paralleling the track of Traditionalist Mainline Protestants.

Thus by 1992, the “traditionalist alliance” was substantially in place within the Republican Party. Figure 2 looks at the other side of religious “restructuring” and the “culture wars,” the Modernist Evangelicals, Mainliners, and Catholics. Here the trends were more complex. Modernist Mainliners were solidly Republican in 1960 and remained so until 1984, after which the Modernist Mainline shifted sharply away from

the GOP, with only a slight revival in 2004. Modernist Evangelicals followed the same basic trajectory as their Mainline cousins, but starting in the Democratic camp and finally reaching the same level of GOP support in 1988, when they also took a sharp turn away from the GOP—but then returning to support Bush in 2000 and 2004. Like Modernist Evangelicals, Modernist Catholics started out Democrats, making dramatic shift to the GOP in 1984, only to follow the other Modernists away from the Republicans through 2004.

[Figure 2 about here]

Figure 3 summarizes these developments by plotting over time a combined measure of traditionalists and modernists (including Evangelicals, Mainliners, and Catholics in each case). By 1972, the traditionalists as a whole were solidly Republican, but the modernists as a whole were also Republican, albeit at a slightly lower rate. But after 1988, the traditionalists remained a fixture in the GOP coalition, while the modernist moved sharply in a Democratic direction, recovering slightly under Bush in 2000 and 2004. Figure 3 also plots the GOP support from the Unaffiliated voters over time, a group often allied with the modernists. In these data, the Unaffiliated were always with the Democrats, but drifted modestly Republican in 1980 and once again in the Bush era.

[Figure 3 about here]

Figure 4 takes one final look at these trends by plotting a “traditionalism gap” over time; this gap is the difference in the GOP vote between all traditionalists combined and all modernists and unaffiliated combined (the GOP vote is included in this figure to help put the gap in context). This “traditionalism gap” peaks in 1960, 1972, and 1992-

1996. Around these peaks, the GOP did relatively better among modernists and the unaffiliated, reducing the relevance of the “traditionalist alliance,” sometimes because of political failure (1964) and sometimes because of political success (1984 and 2004).

[Figure 4 about here]

So, the “traditionalist alliance” in the GOP was in place by 1992 and increasingly relevant to presidential politics as the Modernists and Unaffiliated moved in a Democratic direction.¹³ However, a rival “modernist-secularist alliance” among the Democrats it not congeal as fully during this period—in part because Bush was able to woo some voters from both groups in 2000-2004. Perhaps the solidifying of such an alliance among the Democrats will be the next development in the new faith-based political order.¹⁴

What explains the timing of the rise of the “traditionalist alliance” among Republicans? The most common explanation is two-fold. On the one hand, the inclusion of cultural issue on the national political agenda was a major cause of these changes. The nationalization of issues such as abortion, gay rights, and eventually same-sex marriage made religious differences based on religious traditionalism relevant politically (Lowi 1995). There has been a steady stream of these issues since the 1960s. On the other hand, the “traditionalist alliance” among Republicans was not in place until thirty years after the cultural conflict of the 1960s and twenty years after *Roe v. Wade*. This delay reflects the fact that political organization takes time. For example, the Christian Right was not a

¹³ The “traditionalism gap” in 1992 and 1996 may be artificially increased by the votes cast for Ross Perot, who drew heavily from less traditionally religious voters. So the “traditionalism gap” in 2000 and 2004 may be a better reflection of the underlying reality.

¹⁴ The 2006 congressional election may be harbinger of such a solidification of a “modernist-secularist alliance” among the Democrats. In 2006, the Democrats made very large gains among the Unaffiliated and less frequent worship attenders (see Pew Forum. “Understanding Religion’s Role in the 2006 Election.” <http://pewforum.org/events/?EventID=135>).

political force until the 1980s and did not successfully penetrate the Republican Party organizations until the 1990s (Wilcox and Larson 2006). So, political action was a key factor in the rise of the “traditionalist alliance.”

Figure 4 offers some evidence relevant to both these explanations. The dotted and dashed line is the percentage of the combined traditionalists that listed cultural issues as the most important problem facing the country (see appendix for details). This simple measure parallels the fluctuations in the “traditionalism gap” fairly closely. Note that there was a surge in the percentage of traditionalists who gave priority to cultural issues at the time when the “traditionalist alliance” solidified in the 1990s. Meanwhile, the dashed line represents the percentage of the combined traditionalist that report being contacted by the Republican Party during the election campaigns. Here the level of GOP contacts followed the “traditionalism gap” fairly closely after 1984. There was an upsurge in contacting when the “traditionalist alliance” solidified in the 1990s.

Another interesting thing in Figure 4 is the patterns in the late 1970s and the 1980s: there was a trough in the “traditionalism gap” and also a decline in the salience of cultural issues by, and the GOP contacting of, the traditionalists. This much studied period saw the deployment of the “new” Christian Right and the election of Ronald Reagan (Wilcox 1999). A glance back at Figure 1 reveals that Traditionalist Evangelicals did increase their backing of the Republicans in this era, but the situation was more complex for Traditionalist Mainliners and Catholics, and as Figure 2 shows, even more complicated for the modernists.

These findings help explain both the disappointment of the advocates of cultural conservatism with the Reagan era and scholars’ conclusion that cultural politics had a

limited impact in the 1980s (Bruce 1988). These patterns also reveal something about the “gestation period” for political change in the electorate. In fact, scholars found that the “restructuring” of American religion and “culture wars” were strongly evident among political leaders and activists in the 1980s (Wilcox and Larson 2006)--well before the solidification of the “traditionalist alliance” among Republican voters in 1992. In this sense, the 2004 election may well have represented a fuller translation of the new faith-based divisions from the political activist corps to the electorate (see Green and Jackson 2007).

The Future of the “Traditionalist Alliance”

The journalists and pundits who saw a new kind of faith-based politics in the 2004 presidential election results had found something important, although much of what they noticed had been in place for a decade and it was hardly the only reason for Bush’s very narrow victory. At the same time, the Democratic voter coalitions had support from an emerging alliance of modernists and secularists. The new faith-based elements of these voter coalitions were in part the product of the “restructuring” of American religion, with political differences among religious traditions replaced by differences in traditional religiosity. These new components of party coalitions were motivated by the “culture wars” issues, much more so than the electorate at large. Political leaders and activists played a crucial role in translating these new divisions into electoral coalitions, a process that had taken several decades.

It is likely that the faith-based alignment in 2004 will be a major part of the 2008 election, as evidenced by the role religion is playing in the early stages of the presidential primaries. But this fact does not mean that the Republicans will prevail in 2008—after

all, the GOP lost the popular vote in 2000 despite a strong showing by these forces. This point highlights the fragility of voter coalitions in a closely divided electorate. For one thing, the “traditionalist alliance” is not large enough to carry the Republicans to a popular vote majority on its own. And for that matter, neither is a potential “modernist-secularist” alliance large enough to give the Democrats an outright victory. Another critical source of votes is the Centrist Mainline and Catholics, groups without firm commitments to either party. Religious minorities are also important at the polls, groups with which the Democrats have enjoyed an advantage--in part because religious “restructuring” has not had as much of an impact among them.

Much depends also on the actual performance of these groups at the polls: strong support and high turnout by the “traditionalist alliance” would advantage the Republicans, while a similar performance among religious minorities would help the Democrats. Such performance depends on the issues at stake as well as the character of the particular candidates and the quality of their campaigns. It is easy to imagine a situation where these short-term factors yield different winners, but do not change the underlying faith-based character of voter alignments. The 1964 election is a good example of such a variation in ethno-religious coalitions, and although it was not a presidential election, the 2006 congressional may be a good example of this phenomenon in the new faith-based order.

The “traditionalist alliance” and the rest of the new faith-based order are likely to persist for some time beyond 2008 if only for reasons of inertia. After all, the analysis of the last forty years demonstrates that time is requires for new alignments to solidify—and to decay. However, it could be that the new faith-based political order will be extended

further. In this regard, two groups bear careful scrutiny: Will Centrist Evangelicals become as divided as Mainline and Catholic counterparts? Will Traditionalist Black Protestants move to join other traditionalists in the GOP? By the same token, new issues and circumstances may eventually arise and foster new kinds of faith-based alignments. While it is difficult to predict what these might be, the experience of the last forty years shows that such changes are possible.

Appendix: Surveys, Religious Categories, and Variables

The 2000-2004 Surveys. This analysis uses the Third and Fourth National Surveys of Religion and Politics, conducted by the Bliss Institute at the University of Akron in collaboration with the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life. These surveys were a national random sample of adult Americans (18 years or older), conducted in the spring of 2000 (N=6000) and 2004 (N=4000). The initial sample was then re-interviewed after the 2000 (N=3000) and 2004 elections (N=2730). For the purposes of this analysis, the 2000 and 2004 samples were pooled.

The National Surveys of Religion and Politics contain an extensive series of questions to determine the specific religious affiliation of respondents as accurately as possible. This standard classification is based on the formal beliefs, behaviors and histories of the denominations or churches involved, with the most detail dedicated to sorting out the many kinds of Protestants in the United States (see Kellstedt and Green 1993; Green et al. 1996; Layman 2001; Layman and Green 2005). Black Protestants and Latinos were separated on the basis of race and ethnicity.

The National Surveys of Religion and Politics also contained extensive measures of religious belief and behavior. Five belief items were found in all four surveys (view of the Bible; belief in God; belief in the afterlife; view of the devil and evolution) and so were five behavior items (frequency of worship attendance; frequency of prayer; frequency of Bible reading; frequency of participation in small groups; and level of financial contribution to a congregation). These belief and behavior items were then subjected to separate factor analyses in each of the surveys. The factor loadings were quite similar on all these analyses. A belief and behavior factor score was then generated and the two scores were subjected to a second factor analysis to extract the underlying traditionalism. This final factor analysis also generated a factor score, which was adjusted to the mean score for each surveys by each religious tradition. This adjustment was very modest but corrected for the peculiarities of each survey (see Layman and Green 2005 for a similar approach, but where the belief and behavior items were used independently).

In the final step, the adjusted traditionalism scale was divided into four categories within the three largest religious traditions. The cut-points were the mean traditionalism scores of four levels of religious salience. These cut-points were chosen because they

were specific to the religious traditions, unambiguous, and consistent across surveys. Also, traditional religiosity stresses the importance of religion over other aspects of life (Guth and Green 1993). The Unaffiliated Believers were defined by scoring in the top two-thirds of the belief factor score in each survey.

Although this categorization process is complex, it was remarkably robust, with a wide range of alternative measures, methods, and cut-points producing essentially the same results (see Green et al. 2007 for more details; for other versions of these categories, see Guth et al. 2006; Green and Waldman 2006; and Green 2004).

The cultural and social welfare issue indices were factor scores based on the following topics. Cultural issue indices included abortion, marriage, and gay rights; the social welfare issue indices included the level of government spending and taxes, increase middle class taxes to help the poor, and assistance to minorities. Support for the Iraq war was a four-point scale the whether or not the war was justified. For purposes of the logistic regression analysis, these indices, partisan self-identification, and standard demographic variables were recalculated on a scale from 0 to 1; all the religious categories were dummy variables (0,1); the excluded categories were Centrist Mainline Protestants and Catholics.

The 1964 Survey. This analysis uses the Anti-Semitism in the United States survey conducted in 1964 (N=1975) (Glock et al. 1979). This survey contained measures of the 1960 and 1964 vote, which were weighted to reflect the actual election outcomes.

The religious categories were calculated in the same way as in the 2000-2004 surveys. First, religious traditions from denominational affiliation using the same coding scheme, and second, a traditionalism scale was calculated by factor analyzing four items: worship attendance; belief in God; life after death; the devil; and Jesus is the only way to salvation. The factor score was then adjusted to match the 2000-2004 scores by religious tradition to correct for differences in the measures used. The cut-points for the traditionalist-modernist categories were the mean scores for four levels of religious salience. Nominal and Latino respondents were not numerous enough to create separate categories.

Multivariate analysis was conducted in the same fashion as for the 2000-2004 surveys, except that single items were used for cultural conservatism (a four-scale on whether the country's morals were good or bad and getting better or worse) and social welfare conservatism (a four-point scale on whether people on welfare could take care of themselves).

The 1960-2004 Time Series. The 1960 to 2004 time series data are based on the National Election Survey Cumulative File (American National Election Studies 2005). The NES data has the virtue of consistent political variables over this four-decade period; the election results were weighted to reflect the actual election results. Unfortunately, it lacks consistent and detailed religion measures. Thus, the traditionalists and modernists were estimated from the available data. Traditionalists were defined as weekly worship attenders who had a literal view of the Bible; when a Bible items was not available, a proxy for it was estimated using cultural issue positions and ideology. Whenever possible these estimates were compared to other contemporary surveys with more complete religion measures, and in a few instances, where the number of cases was small, the figures were adjusted on the basis of the other surveys. The social issue salience was

calculates by aggregating an open-ended question in the most important problem facing the nation (see Green 2007); the party contact variable was used directly.

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Table 1 Religion and the Bush Vote, 2000-2004: Preferences and Coalitions

	Preferences:			Coalitions:		All
	<i>Bush</i>	<i>Democrats</i>	Total	<i>Bush</i>	<i>Democrats</i>	
Strongest Bush Supporters						
Traditionalist Evangelicals	87.6	12.4	100.0	23.8	3.4	13.7
Other Christians	70.7	29.3	100.0	3.7	1.6	2.6
Traditionalist Mainline	69.5	30.5	100.0	7.7	3.4	5.6
Traditionalist Catholics	68.8	31.2	100.0	8.3	3.8	6.1
Centrist Evangelicals	68.1	31.9	100.0	10.9	5.2	8.1
Weak Bush Supporters						
Nominal Evangelicals	52.3	47.7	100.0	1.5	1.4	1.4
Modernist Evangelicals	51.4	48.6	100.0	2.4	2.3	2.4
Centrist Catholics	50.9	49.1	100.0	7.4	7.3	7.3
Centrist Mainline	50.5	49.5	100.0	6.5	6.5	6.5
ALL	50.5	49.5	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Weak Democratic Supporters						
Modernist Mainline	49.6	50.4	100.0	3.8	4.0	3.9
Hispanic Protestants	48.4	51.6	100.0	2.0	2.1	2.1
Strong Democratic Supporters						
Modernist Catholic	42.4	57.6	100.0	3.2	4.4	3.8
Nominal Mainline	41.7	58.3	100.0	2.2	3.2	2.7
Seculars	34.1	65.9	100.0	5.0	9.8	7.4
Strongest Democratic Supporters						
Unaffiliated Believers	33.0	67.0	100.0	1.9	4.0	2.9
Nominal Catholic	31.0	69.0	100.0	1.1	2.6	1.9
Latino Catholic	28.9	71.1	100.0	1.8	4.5	3.1
Other Faiths	28.9	71.1	100.0	1.8	4.5	3.1
Atheists, Agnostics	25.6	74.4	100.0	2.0	6.0	4.0
Jews	24.1	75.9	100.0	1.3	4.3	2.8
Traditionalist Black Protestants	10.8	89.2	100.0	0.9	7.5	4.2
Less Traditional Black Protestants	10.0	90.0	100.0	0.9	8.2	4.5

Source: 2000 and 2004 Religious Landscape Surveys (N=3113)

Table 2 Demography, Religious Groups, and the Bush Vote, 2000-2004

Logistic Regression

	B	Sig.
Demography		
Income	0.906	0.000
Education	-0.604	0.013
Gender	-1.468	0.000
Region	0.518	0.001
Age	-0.653	0.000
Marital status	0.419	0.002
Religious Groups		
Traditionalist Evangelicals	1.872	0.000
Other Christians	0.927	0.001
Traditionalist Mainline	0.925	0.000
Traditionalist Catholics	0.877	0.000
Centrist Evangelicals	0.684	0.000
<i>Nominal Evangelicals</i>	<i>-0.045</i>	<i>0.859</i>
<i>Modernist Evangelicals</i>	<i>-0.047</i>	<i>0.860</i>
<i>Centrist Catholics</i>	<i>0.040</i>	<i>0.820</i>
<i>Latino Protestants</i>	<i>-0.093</i>	<i>0.743</i>
Modernist Catholic	-0.445	0.044
Nominal Mainline	-0.493	0.052
Seculars	-0.796	0.000
Unaffiliated Believers	-0.814	0.001
Nominal Catholic	-1.004	0.001
Latino Catholic	-1.118	0.000
Other Faiths	-1.068	0.000
Atheists, Agnostics	-1.245	0.000
Jews	-1.104	0.000
Black Protestants	-2.176	0.000
Constant	0.651	0.038
Nagelkerke R Square	0.324	
% Predicted Correctly	0.710	

Source: 2000 and 2004 Religious Landscape Surveys (N=3113)

Table 3 Religion, Income, and the Bush Vote 2000-2004

	<u>% Higher Income</u>	Bush percentage of the two-party vote:			
		<i>All</i>	<i>Lower income</i>	<i>Higher income</i>	<i>Income Gap</i>
Strong Bush Supporters					
Traditionalist Evangelicals	<u>50.8</u>	87.6	78.8	93.2	14.4
Other Christians	<u>37.1</u>	70.7	68.4	71.4	3.0
Traditionalist Mainline	<u>47.8</u>	69.5	64.2	72.7	8.5
Traditionalist Catholics	<u>49.8</u>	68.8	55.0	75.3	20.3
Centrist Evangelicals	<u>44.2</u>	68.1	58.1	77.0	18.9
Weak Bush Supporters					
Nominal Evangelicals	<u>37.2</u>	52.3	57.9	47.8	-10.1
Modernist Evangelicals	<u>41.1</u>	51.4	42.4	61.1	18.7
Centrist Catholics	<u>60.9</u>	50.9	33.8	58.7	24.9
Centrist Mainline	<u>46.8</u>	50.5	43.2	56.1	12.9
ALL	<u>46.6</u>	50.5	43.8	55.1	11.3
Weak Democratic Supporters					
Modernist Mainline	<u>52.3</u>	49.6	39.5	55.6	16.1
Latino Protestants	<u>27.7</u>	48.4	54.3	42.9	-11.4
Strong Democratic Supporters					
Modernist Catholic	<u>57.4</u>	42.4	26.5	49.4	22.9
Nominal Mainline	<u>64.3</u>	41.7	47.6	40.7	-6.9
Seculars	<u>47.1</u>	34.1	31.7	34.3	2.6
Strongest Democratic Supporters					
Unaffiliated Believers	<u>31.5</u>	33.0	39.0	25.5	-13.5
Nominal Catholic	<u>56.0</u>	31.0	23.8	33.3	9.5
Latino Catholic	<u>34.6</u>	28.9	18.6	41.2	22.6
Other Faiths	<u>47.9</u>	28.9	26.5	31.1	4.6
Atheists, Agnostics	<u>65.1</u>	25.6	26.7	23.8	-2.9
Jews	<u>68.3</u>	24.1	34.8	20.3	-14.5
Traditionalist Black Protestants	<u>36.7</u>	10.8	9.5	15.2	5.7
Less Traditional Black Protestants	<u>20.8</u>	10.0	7.1	18.2	11.1

Source: 2000 and 2004 Religious Landscape Surveys (N=3113)

Table 4 Political Attitudes, Demography, Religion, and the Bush Vote, 2000-2004

Logistic Regression

	B	Sig.
Political Attitudes		
Partisanship	6.659	0.000
Cultural Issues	1.963	0.000
Social Welfare Issues	1.255	0.000
Demography		
Income	0.409	0.214
Education	-0.726	0.048
Gender	-0.334	0.200
Region	0.284	0.214
Age	-0.824	0.002
Marital status	0.362	0.072
Religious Groups		
Traditionalist Evangelicals	0.615	0.023
<i>Other Christians</i>	-0.020	0.961
<i>Traditionalist Mainline</i>	0.471	0.128
<i>Traditionalist Catholics</i>	0.292	0.301
Centrist Evangelicals	0.553	0.035
<i>Nominal Evangelicals</i>	-0.201	0.610
<i>Modernist Evangelicals</i>	-0.231	0.585
<i>Centrist Catholics</i>	0.111	0.736
<i>Latino Protestants</i>	-0.193	0.668
<i>Modernist Catholic</i>	-0.188	0.546
<i>Nominal Mainline</i>	-0.681	0.078
<i>Seculars</i>	-0.075	0.778
<i>Unaffiliated Believers</i>	-0.521	0.140
<i>Nominal Catholic</i>	-0.697	0.119
Latino Catholic	-0.917	0.020
<i>Other Faiths</i>	-0.153	0.651
<i>Atheists, Agnostics</i>	-0.383	0.262
<i>Jews</i>	-0.644	0.103
Black Protestants	-1.873	0.000
Constant	3.102	0.000
Nagelkerke R Square	0.750	
% Predicted Correctly	0.895	

Source: 2000 and 2004 Religious Landscape Surveys (N=3113)

Table 5 Religion, Partisanship, and Issue Positions, 2000-2004

	<i>Bush Vote</i>	<i>Mean Republicanism</i>	<i>Mean Cultural Conservatism</i>	<i>Mean Social Welfare Conservatism</i>
Strongest Bush Supporters				
Traditionalist Evangelicals	87.6	63.3	66.9	57.8
Other Christians	70.7	50.4	50.8	52.1
Traditionalist Mainline	69.5	52.3	47.6	53.6
Traditionalist Catholics	68.8	49.4	53.9	51.1
Centrist Evangelicals	68.1	49.6	47.9	51.3
Weak Bush Supporters				
Nominal Evangelicals	52.3	29.9	29.4	52.1
Modernist Evangelicals	51.4	42.3	40.9	50.6
Centrist Catholics	50.9	47.6	36.7	48.0
Centrist Mainline	50.5	37.2	33.0	51.9
ALL	50.5	41.9	39.8	49.0
Weak Democratic Supporters				
Modernist Mainline	49.6	44.4	30.0	49.8
Latino Protestants	48.4	41.9	43.9	45.3
Strong Democratic Supporters				
Modernist Catholic	42.4	33.9	27.9	47.8
Nominal Mainline	41.7	43.5	22.6	45.8
Seculars	34.1	36.1	21.8	47.4
Strongest Democratic Supporters				
Unaffiliated Believers	33.0	38.9	41.0	48.7
Nominal Catholic	31.0	42.5	25.7	50.3
Latino Catholic	28.9	30.8	39.2	44.3
Other Faiths	28.9	30.6	23.4	40.6
Atheists, Agnostics	25.6	32.3	17.8	45.4
Jews	24.1	29.3	19.1	39.9
Traditionalist Black Protestants	10.8	16.3	53.0	41.2
Less Traditional Black Protestants	10.0	19.7	36.0	40.0

Source: 2000 and 2004 Religious Landscape Surveys (N=3113)

Table 6 Religion and the Iraq War, 2004

	<i>Bush Vote</i>	<i>Support Iraq War</i>	<i>Oppose Iraq War</i>
Strongest Bush Supporters			
Traditionalist Evangelicals	87.6	85.1	14.9
Other Christians	70.7	75.0	25.0
Traditionalist Mainline	69.5	66.7	33.3
Traditionalist Catholics	68.8	73.3	26.7
Centrist Evangelicals	68.1	76.1	23.9
Weak Bush Supporters			
Nominal Evangelicals	52.3	52.8	47.2
Modernist Evangelicals	51.4	66.7	33.3
Centrist Catholics	50.9	60.3	39.7
Centrist Mainline	50.5	57.1	42.9
ALL	50.5	59.0	41.0
Weak Democratic Supporters			
Modernist Mainline	49.6	55.8	44.2
Latino Protestants	48.4	74.3	25.7
Strong Democratic Supporters			
Modernist Catholic	42.4	56.5	43.5
Nominal Mainline	41.7	43.6	56.4
Seculars	34.1	46.2	53.8
Strongest Democratic Supporters			
Unaffiliated Believers	33.0	50.0	50.0
Nominal Catholic	31.0	56.5	43.5
Latino Catholic	28.9	53.7	46.3
Other Faiths	28.9	31.4	68.6
Atheists, Agnostics	25.6	27.3	72.7
Jews	24.1	46.0	54.0
Traditionalist Black Protestants	10.8	36.9	63.1
Less Traditional Black Protestants	10.0	40.5	59.5

Source: 2004 Religious Landscape Surveys (N=1575)

Table 7a Religion and the Nixon Vote, 1960

	Preferences:			Coalitions:		
	<i>Nixon</i>	<i>Kennedy</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Nixon</i>	<i>Kennedy</i>	<i>All</i>
Strongest Nixon Supporters						
Modernist Mainline	75.5	24.5	100.0	11.4	3.7	7.5
Traditionalist Evangelicals	71.1	28.9	100.0	13.7	5.5	9.6
Centrist Mainline	67.2	32.8	100.0	22.0	10.7	16.3
Traditionalist Mainline	67.0	33.0	100.0	20.0	9.8	14.9
Strong Nixon Supporters						
Modernist Evangelicals	58.9	41.1	100.0	4.7	3.3	4.0
Centrist Evangelicals	58.8	41.3	100.0	6.7	4.7	5.7
Other Christians	55.9	44.1	100.0	2.7	2.1	2.4
Other Faiths	55.6	44.4	100.0	1.4	1.1	1.3
All	49.9	50.1	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Strongest Kennedy Supporters						
Unaffiliated	33.8	66.2	100.0	3.7	7.2	5.5
Centrist Catholic	31.0	69.0	100.0	4.4	9.8	7.1
Traditionalist Catholic	20.7	79.3	100.0	4.9	18.5	11.7
Modernist Catholics	19.6	80.4	100.0	1.6	6.4	4.0
Black Protestants	16.3	83.7	100.0	2.3	11.6	7.0
Jews	9.3	90.7	100.0	0.6	5.5	3.1

Source: 1964 Anti-Semitism Survey (N=1975)

Table 7b Religion and the Goldwater Vote, 1964

	Preferences:			Coalitions:		
	<i>Goldwater</i>	<i>Johnson</i>	Total	<i>Goldwater</i>	<i>Johnson</i>	All
Strongest Goldwater Supporters						
Modernist Evangelicals	57.6	42.4	100	6.3	3.0	4.3
Traditionalist Evangelicals	57.6	42.4	100	15.3	7.2	10.4
Other Faiths	56.5	43.5	100	1.7	0.8	1.2
Modernist Mainline	55.9	44.1	100	9.8	5.0	6.9
Weak Goldwater Supporters						
Centrist Mainline	51.3	48.7	100	18.3	11.1	13.9
Traditionalist Mainline	50.2	49.8	100	16.2	10.3	12.6
All	39.0	61.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Weak Johnson Supporters						
Centrist Evangelicals	48.9	51.1	100	8.8	5.9	7.1
Strongest Johnson Supporters						
Other Christians	37.2	62.8	100	2.1	2.2	2.2
Centrist Catholic	29.9	70.1	100	5.2	7.8	6.8
Unaffiliated	29.1	70.9	100	4.4	6.9	5.9
Modernist Catholics	24.0	76.0	100	2.3	4.7	3.8
Traditionalist Catholic	23.8	76.2	100	7.5	15.5	12.3
Jews	8.9	91.1	100	0.6	4.2	2.9
Black Protestants	5.6	94.4	100	4.4	15.4	9.9

Source: 1964 Anti-Semitism Survey (N=1975)

Table 8 Demography, Religious Groups, and the Republican Vote, 1960 and 1964

<i>Logistic Regression</i>	1960		1964	
	B	Sig.	B	Sig.
Demography				
Income	0.08	0.14	0.12	0.01
Education	0.30	0.00	0.26	0.00
Gender	0.06	0.68	-0.21	0.05
Region	-0.17	0.01	0.11	0.03
Age	0.11	0.00	0.09	0.00
Marital status	-0.06	0.38	0.01	0.84
Religious Groups				
Modernist Mainline	0.29	0.29	0.05	0.80
Traditionalist Evangelicals	0.45	0.06	0.34	0.06
Centrist Mainline	-0.06	0.78	0.00	0.98
Traditionalist Mainline	-0.05	0.80	-0.01	0.99
Modernist Evangelicals	-0.17	0.58	0.39	0.12
Other Faiths	-0.92	0.07	-0.01	0.98
<i>Centrist Evangelical</i>	<i>ex</i>	<i>ex</i>	<i>ex</i>	<i>ex</i>
Other Christians	-0.53	0.16	-0.68	0.05
Unaffiliated	-1.32	0.00	-0.92	0.00
Centrist Catholic	-1.72	0.00	-0.83	0.00
Modernist Catholic	-0.93	0.02	-1.06	0.00
Traditionalist Catholics	-0.69	0.02	-0.80	0.01
Black Protestants	-2.13	0.00	-2.84	0.00
Jews	-2.00	0.00	-2.50	0.00
Constant	-0.50	0.35	-1.58	0.00
Nagelkerke R Square	0.28		0.22	
% Predicted Correctly	0.70		0.67	

Source: 1964 Anti-Semitism Survey (N=1975)

Table 9 Political Attitudes, Demography, Religious Groups, and the Republican Vote, 1960 and 1964

<i>Logistic Regression</i>	1960		1964	
	B	Sig.	B	Sig.
Political Attitudes				
Partisanship	1.68	0.00	1.22	0.00
Cultural Issues	0.11	0.10	0.20	0.00
Social Welfare Issues	0.06	0.71	0.69	0.00
Demography				
Income	0.06	0.38	0.09	0.07
Education	0.21	0.00	0.19	0.00
Gender	0.04	0.83	-0.37	0.01
Region	0.13	0.13	0.38	0.00
Age	0.08	0.02	0.07	0.00
Marital status	-0.11	0.20	0.00	0.94
Religious Groups				
Modernist Mainline	0.70	0.07	-0.01	0.97
Traditionalist Evangelicals	0.49	0.11	0.29	0.21
Centrist Mainline	-0.23	0.40	-0.05	0.82
Traditionalist Mainline	-0.20	0.45	-0.01	0.99
Modernist Evangelicals	0.19	0.66	0.66	0.04
Other Faiths	-0.69	0.34	0.19	0.73
<i>Centrist Evangelical</i>	<i>ex</i>	<i>ex</i>	<i>ex</i>	<i>ex</i>
Other Christians	-0.21	0.68	-0.61	0.13
Unaffiliated	-0.81	0.04	-0.41	0.18
Centrist Catholic	-1.54	0.00	-0.43	0.13
Modernist Catholic	-1.45	0.00	-0.37	0.11
Traditionalist Catholics	-1.45	0.00	-0.47	0.24
Black Protestants	-1.64	0.00	-2.58	0.00
Jews	-1.90	0.00	-2.30	0.00
Constant	3.05	0.00	2.15	0.00
Nagelkerke R Square	0.61		0.47	
% Predicted Correctly	0.83		0.79	

Source: 1964 Anti-Semitism Survey (N=1975)

Table 10 Religion, Partisanship, and Issue Positions, 1960 and 1964

	<i>% GOP Vote</i>	<i>% Republican</i>	<i>% Cultural Conservatism</i>	<i>% Social Welfare Conservatism</i>
Modernist Mainline	65.7	53.3	35.5	63.6
Traditionalist Evangelicals	64.4	42.0	58.3	61.2
Centrist Mainline	59.3	53.6	49.4	60.4
Traditionalist Mainline	58.6	53.6	44.8	53.0
Modernist Evangelicals	58.4	40.7	37.0	57.9
Other Faiths	56.0	41.7	40.0	54.5
ALL	44.5	35.6	43.9	56.4
Centrist Evangelicals	53.9	36.9	51.9	60.9
Other Christians	46.6	37.2	58.5	60.5
Unaffiliated	31.4	23.1	36.9	49.5
Centrist Catholics	30.5	29.9	35.4	59.1
Modernist Catholics	22.2	20.0	42.9	61.8
Traditionalist Catholics	21.8	19.3	44.7	59.3
Black Protestants	10.9	9.2	31.2	43.2
Jews	9.1	8.9	34.6	34.0

Source: 1964 Anti-Semitism Survey (N=1975)

Figure 1. Republican Presidential Vote and Traditionalists, 1960-2004




Figure 2. Republican Presidential Vote and Modernists, 1960-2004




Figure 3. Republican Presidential Vote, Traditionalists and Modernists, 1960-2004




Figure 4. The Traditionalism Gap, 1960-2004

